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We document a statistical association between the severity of the persecution and mass murder of
Jews (the Holocaust) by the Nazis during World War II and long-run economic and political outcomes
within Russia. Cities that experienced the Holocaust most intensely have grown less, and cities as
well as administrative districts (oblasts) where the Holocaust had the largest impact have worse economic
and political outcomes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although we cannot rule out the possibility
that these statistical relationships are caused by other factors, the overall patterns appear generally
robust. We provide evidence on one possible mechanism that we hypothesize may link the Holocaust
to the present---the change it induced in the social structure, in particular the size of the middle class,
across different regions of Russia. Before World War II, Russian Jews were predominantly in white
collar (middle class) occupations and the Holocaust appears to have had a large negative effect on
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The mass murder of about 6 million Jews in the Holocaust during the Second World War was
a major cataclysmic event for Europe, Russia, and the World. In this paper, we investigate
some of the economic and political legacies of the Holocaust within Russia.1 The Holocaust
undoubtedly had many diverse cultural, social and even psychological e⁄ects, many of which
have been studied by historians and other scholars. Nevertheless, it appears that the quan-
titative consequences of the Holocaust for long-run economic and political development have
not previously been examined.
Our empirical analysis shows a persistent correlation between the severity of the persecution
and displacement of Jews due the Holocaust and long-run economic and political outcomes in
Russia. We construct a proxy measure for the severity of the Holocaust by using the pre-war
fraction of the population that was of Jewish origin in cities and oblasts (an administrative
unit with a typical size between a U.S. county and state) and interacting it with information
on which areas were under German occupation during the Second World War. We also use
information on changes in the size of the Jewish population before and after the Second World
War (only for oblasts). We ￿nd that cities where the Holocaust was more intense have relatively
lower population today and have voted in greater numbers for Communist candidates since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar results also hold for oblasts that were impacted relatively
more by the Holocaust. Such oblasts have lower levels of per capita income, and lower average
wages today. Moreover, they tended to exhibit greater vote shares for Communist candidates
during the 1990s and higher support for preserving the Soviet Union in the referendum of 1991.
By its nature, the evidence we present in this paper is based on historical correlations and
should thus be interpreted with caution. We cannot rule out the possibility that some omitted
factor might be responsible for the statistical association between the severity of the Holocaust
and the long-run economic, political and social development of Russian cities and oblasts.
Nevertheless, the patterns we document are generally robust across di⁄erent speci￿cations.
We also show that prior to the Second World War, the economic performance of these areas
did not exhibit di⁄erential trends.
One di¢ culty with the interpretation of our results is that the magnitudes of the estimated
1By Russia we henceforth mean the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and not the other Republics
such as the Kazakh S.S.R. the Uzbek S.S.R. etc. We focus on Russia for two reasons. The ￿rst is availability
and comparability of data. The second is that the administration of non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union
under Nazi occupation di⁄ered greatly. Later in the paper, we provide separate results for Ukraine where
we take the Ukraine to be that part of the current Ukraine which was part of the Soviet Union prior to the
Molotov￿ Ribbentrop Pact.
1e⁄ects are large. For example, using the city-level data, our estimates suggest that the ￿av-
erage￿occupied city (meaning a city with the average fraction of Jewish population among
occupied cities) would have been about 14% larger in 1989 had it not been occupied by the
Nazis. This e⁄ect is signi￿cantly larger than the possible direct impact of the Holocaust on
the size of city populations through the mass murder of the Jewish inhabitants. While this
magnitude might re￿ ect the presence of omitted factors, it may also result if the Holocaust
caused a divergent trend among Russian cities and oblasts. The general pattern of our results,
which show an e⁄ect growing over time, is consistent with such a divergence.
We investigate two possible channels through which the Holocaust may have caused a
divergent trend across Russian cities and oblasts: (1) its impact on social structure (the size
of the middle class); and (2) its impact on educational attainment. There is a long tradition
in social science linking social structure, in particular the presence of a large middle class, to
political and economic development.2 Before the initiation of Operation Barbarossa on June
22, 1941, which led to the German occupation of extensive parts of Western Russia, Jews were
heavily overrepresented in what we would typically consider to be ￿middle class￿occupations.3
Over 67% of the Jews living in Russia held a white collar job, while only about 15% of non-
Jews had a white-collar occupation (see Figure 1). Jews thus constituted a large share of
the middle class. For example, in the occupied areas with the largest Jewish communities,
10% of white collar workers in the trade and health care sectors and 68% of all physicians
were Jewish. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazis initiated the Holocaust and
systematically persecuted and murdered the Jewish population of the territories they occupied.
The Holocaust was therefore a major shock to the social structure of the invaded regions. We
document a statistical association between the Holocaust and the size of the middle class after
the war (in 1959) and more recently (in 1970, 1979 and 1989).
One complication with interpreting the channel between the Holocaust and contemporary
outcomes is that until the 1990s, the Soviet Union was a centrally planned economy. Thus
the divergence, through whichever channel, may not be directly attributable to changes in
2De Tocqueville (1835,1840 [2000]), Pirenne (1925, 1963), and Moore (1966) viewed the size of the middle
class as a key factor inpromoting political development. Recent works emphasizing this viewpoint include
Hofstadter (1955), Huntington (1968, 1991), Lipset (1959) and Dahl (1971). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006,
chapter 8) propose a mechanism for such an e⁄ect of the middle class. Murphy, Vishny and Shleifer (1989),
Engerman and Sokolo⁄ (1997), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) propose di⁄erent mechanisms
through which the existence of a large and/or politically powerful middle class can encourage long-run economic
development.
3Altshuler (1993) estimates a total Jewish population of 2,864,467 for Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus in
1939. The exact number and distribution of Holocaust victims is controversial in the historical literature (see
Section 2). Nevertheless, the scholarly consensus is that around 1 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust were
residents of the former Soviet Union (see Maksudov, 1993).
2relative prices or economic returns. However, the presence of central planning does not rule
out potential local economic and political e⁄ects. For example, the size of the middle class may
have in￿ uenced economic and social development through political channels because the local
bureaucracy and local party o¢ cials were typically recruited from the middle class. Moreover,
the initial shock to the size of the middle class may have propagated through central planning
itself. The existing consensus is that Soviet economic planning determined the allocation
of resources in a highly ￿history-dependent￿ manner.4 Thus the post-war changes in the
occupational, industrial, and educational mix of a city or an oblast could have plausibly a⁄ected
what types of resources were allocated to that area in future plans, leading to an overall pattern
of divergence, triggered by post-war di⁄erences.5
Although the e⁄ect on the size of the middle class is a plausible catalyst for large adverse
e⁄ects of the Holocaust over the long term, the evidence we are able to provide is again based
on historical correlations. We thus exercise due caution in the interpretation of our results.
An obvious challenge to our results is that Russian society was subject to other large and
persistent shocks throughout both the 1920s, 1930s, and during the postwar era. These include
the Stalinist purges in the 1930s and the great famine that struck the countryside in 1932
and 1933 following the collectivization of agriculture and the draconian grain requisitioning
policies.6 Perhaps most importantly, the entire Soviet Union su⁄ered a tremendous loss of life
and hardship under German occupation.7 These shocks, terrible though they were, appear
not to confound our results. The famine mostly devastated rural areas, but most Jews were in
urban areas. The Stalinist purges also caused much damage on Russians and Jews, and may be
confounding our results (though the purges before the Second World War were not speci￿cally
targeted at Jews, but at supposed opponents of the regime). As an attempt to separate the
e⁄ects of the Holocaust from other potential long-run impacts of German occupation, we report
4This is discussed in Roland (2000), who describes the process of resource allocation in the Soviet Union as
￿planning from the achieved level￿(see, particularly, p. 8, and the references therein).
5It should be emphasized that central planning tended to focus on outputs, and Hanson (2003, p. 12) notes:
￿People were not sent under compulsory plan instructions to work at this or that enterprise. They could and
did change jobs of their own volition ... By and large ... there was a market relationship between the state as
employer and the household sector as a provider of labour services. People needed to be induced by pecuniary
and non-pecuniary bene￿ts to work at a particular workplace.￿This statement does not refer to the collective
farm sector prior to 1965 because peasants were not allowed to leave the farm (they were not given internal
passports until 1965) (see Hanson, 2003, p. 66). Nevertheless, it does apply to the largest part of the economy
and particularly those industries which would have been using middle class and educated workers.
6On the famine in general see Conquest (1986). Davies and Wheatcroft (2004) and Maksudov (2001) provide
evidence on the extent of excess mortality during this period. Conquest (1990) is a good introduction to the
history of Stalinist purges.
7The total loss of Russian life during the war is estimated to be about 26-27 million (Ellman and Maksudov,
1994).
3both results that rely only on comparisons among cities occupied by the Nazis as well as results
from regressions that control for estimates of the total loss of life. These results are very similar
to our baseline ￿ndings.8
An additional challenge is that the e⁄ects we are estimating might be partly due to di⁄er-
ences in the current fraction of the population that are Jewish. We believe that this alternative
mechanism is unlikely to be responsible for our results because few Jews remain in di⁄erent
parts of Russia today and our results are robust to controlling for the current Jewish fraction
of the population.9
Finally, it is unclear how the economic interpretation of our ￿ndings would generalize be-
yond the Russian context. First, as noted above, central planning during the Communist era
may itself have contributed to the persistence of the impact of the Holocaust on social struc-
ture. Second, the relationship between the size of the middle class and political and economic
development may have been qualitatively di⁄erent during the Communist era than in a market
economy. Third, the association between the Holocaust and our economic outcomes (which
are measured in 2002) may have become particularly pronounced only after the collapse of
Communism. Available data do not enable us to provide direct evidence on these possibilities.
The hypothesis that the Holocaust may have had enduring and quanti￿able economic e⁄ects
appears not to have been investigated previously.10 This also appears to be true with respect to
earlier persecutions of Jews, such as their expulsion from Spain in 1492.11 There is a voluminous
8Naturally, since the total loss of life is also caused by German occupation, it is correlated with the Holocaust,
and its inclusion may lead to an underestimate of the e⁄ect of the Holocaust (in the terminology of Angrist
and Pischke, 2008, it is a ￿bad control￿ ). It is thus reassuring that its inclusion does not change the qualitative
nature of our results.
9Unfortunately, all of our key economic and political outcome variables are for the 1990s and early 2000s,
and thus could potentially be a⁄ected by Jewish outmigration from Russia. While this is a concern, we do not
believe that it invalidates our empirical exercise, for at least two reasons. First, the e⁄ects we report are too
large to be accounted for by direct impact of having a smaller Jewish population or middle class. Instead, they
likely work through the persistent impact of the Holocaust on Russian social structure. If so, they are unlikely
to be driven by the outmigration of the Jews, who already made up a very small fraction of the population of
Russia in the 1990s (0.11% of the population in 1989). Second, we show that the impact on city population
and size of the middle class is present before the 1990s, suggesting that the e⁄ects we ￿nd are unlikely to be a
simple consequence of Jewish outmigration in the 1990s.
10The notion that the Holocaust may have had a long-run economic impact has also not appeared in works
on the economic history of the Soviet Union (e.g., Nove, 1982, Davies, 1998, or Allen, 2003), in more specialized
studies of the War￿ s legacy (e.g., the essays in Linz, 1985), or in work on the Holocaust￿ s legacy more generally
(e.g., the essays in Gitelman, 1997). Allan (1974) emphasizes the potential economic e⁄ects of the relocation
of industry during the war, a factor we directly control for in our results. Political scientists have investigated
the role of various historical factors in post-transition Russia (see the essays in Ekiert and Hanson, 2003, and
also Wittenberg, 2006, and Pop-Eleches, 2007), but the notion that the Holocaust could have had signi￿cant
enduring e⁄ects on support for communism or other political outcomes in the Soviet Union appears not to have
been discussed.
11The one example where the wholesale persecution and explusion of a religious community has been recog-
nized to have had long-run economic e⁄ects is the case of the Huguenots (Scoville, 1960, Benedict, 2001).
4academic literature on the origins, causes, nature and in￿ uence of the Holocaust. Part of this
work examines the legacy of the Holocaust, focusing on issues such as what lessons have been
drawn from the Holocaust or how societies, individuals and families that went through it have
dealt with this experience.12 The study of the political consequences of the Holocaust has
focused on the extent of anti-Semitism, the implications for the strength of nationalism, and
the formation of the state of Israel. Economic issues are discussed in the Holocaust literature
in several contexts. One is the expropriation of the wealth and assets of Jewish people (see
Rickman, 2006, and Aly, 2007, for recent discussions). Another is the economic loss incurred
during the war itself by the murder of so many skilled workers. Many authors point out that
this happened even though Jews were working in forced labor camps which produced vital
inputs to the German economy (e.g., Hilberg, 2004, pp. 523-543 on Poland). Expropriations
of Jewish assets in themselves may have had long-run e⁄ects, for example on post-War income
distribution, and Gross (2006) argues that they can explain the persistence of anti-Semitism
in Poland. Particularly relevant to our study is Waldinger￿ s recent work on the e⁄ect of the
expulsion of Jewish academics on German universities (Waldinger, 2009). To our knowledge
none of these prior works have explored how the intensity of the Holocaust in￿ uences political
and economic variables today.
Our ￿ndings on long-run economic consequences relate to a broader literature about the
enduring e⁄ects of negative shocks or crises. Perhaps the most famous example concerns
the economic and institutional consequences in Europe of the outbreak of the Black Death
in the 1340s (Postan, 1944, 1973, North and Thomas, 1973, Brenner, 1976). Another famous
example is Olson￿ s (1982) argument that the destruction and dislocation wrought by the Second
World War in Europe promoted economic growth by destroying rent-seeking coalitions. Other
examples that have been studied in economics and in other social sciences include the e⁄ects
of the 1840s Irish famine on emigration and industrialization (O￿ Rourke, 1991, 1994, Whelan,
1999, ￿ GrÆda, 2000), the e⁄ects of general loss of life and economic damage caused by wars
(Davis and Weinstein, 2002, Miguel and Roland, 2007), and the persistent e⁄ects of slavery
and slave trade on sub-Saharan Africa (Law, 1991, Lovejoy, 2000, Nunn, 2008).13 In related
research, Chaney (2008) studies the long-run impact of the 1609 expulsion of 120,000 Moriscos
(descendents of Muslims converted to Christianity during the Spanish reconquest) and ￿nds
12For representative sets of essays examining di⁄erent aspects of the legacy of the Holcaust see the volumes
edited by Bartov (2000) and Stone (2004). Berenbaum (2007) provides a very useful introduction to the
historiography on the Holocaust.
13There is also an interesting literature on the persistent e⁄ects of famines on individual health and well-being,
for example, Barber and Dzeniskevich (2005) on the Leningrad famine during the Nazi occupation of Russia, or
Meng and Qian (2008) on the Chinese famine.
5that 178 years later former Morisco areas were relatively more agrarian. It is also worth
noting that the implications of general collapses in population and of events that change the
composition of the population in terms of social structure and educational attainment, such as
the Holocaust and the Cambodian genocide (which speci￿cally targeted educated and middle
class Cambodians, see e.g., Kiernan, 2002) might be di⁄erent. This might be at the root of
the di⁄erences between our results, which show signi￿cant long-run implications, and those of
Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Miguel and Roland (2007), who do not ￿nd such long-run
e⁄ects from general collapses in population in Japan and Vietnam.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the historical background of the Jewish
population of Russia, the German occupation of the Soviet Union, and the Holocaust. Section
3 discusses the data and its construction, presents some descriptive statistics and explains
our measures of the potential impact of the Holocaust in more detail. Section 4 looks at the
basic relationship between the potential impact of the Holocaust and economic and political
outcomes across Russian cities. Section 5 then looks at similar relationships at the oblast level
and also documents the relationship between the Holocaust and the evolution of the size of
the middle class. Section 6 contains additional robustness checks. Section 7 concludes, while
the online appendix contains additional robustness checks and details.
2 The Holocaust in Soviet Russia
2.1 Distribution of the Jewish Population in Pre-War Russia
The key source of variation in our measure of the impact of the Holocaust is the location
of the Jews in Russia before the German occupation. The origins of Jewish communities in
Russia were in the Greek colonies around the Black Sea in the 3rd or 4th century BC. Jewish
communities spread into Armenia and the Crimea, and it appears that the conversion of the
Khazars of the Northern Caucuses to Judaism in the 8th century played an important role
in establishing large Jewish populations in Southern Russia and the Ukraine (see Beizer and
Romanowski, 2007). After the collapse of the Khazarian state, Jews scattered over a large
territory in Western Russia and connected locations, and by 1000 AD there is evidence of a
Jewish community in Kiev.
The other main source of Jewish settlements in the Soviet Union was the Kingdom of Poland
and Lithuania. In the 14th century Lithuania gained control of large parts of Western Russia,
and by the end of the century the ￿rst privileges were granted to Jewish communities. Poland
became something of a haven for Jews during this period and was the recipient of migration
6from other parts of Europe including Spain after the expulsion of the Jews in 1492.14 During
this early period, the Principality of Moscow, the hub of the future Russian state, was very
hostile to Jews and excluded them from its territories. The Russian expansion west, however,
brought large Jewish communities within its borders. This was particularly so with the three
partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795. The location of Jews was institutionalized with a
decree of 1791 by Catherine the Great, which con￿rmed their right to live where they had been
in Poland and on the Black Sea shore; these areas, along with Bessarabia, annexed in 1812,
and parts of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Poland, annexed in 1815, formed the ￿Jewish Pale.￿
The Pale consisted of about 20% of the territory of European Russia, and included much of
present-day Lithuania, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Ukraine, and parts of western Russia. The
Jews formed about 1/9th of the population of this area. Beizer and Romanowski (2007, p.
532) describe the social role of the Jews as:
￿they essentially formed the middle class between the aristocracy and the landown-
ers on the one hand, and the masses of enslaved peasants on the other.￿
Until the Pale was abolished in February 1917, there were few opportunities for Jews
to live outside it. Alexander II granted the right of residence throughout Russia to selected
￿useful￿Jews, such as wealthy merchants (in 1859), university graduates (in 1861) and certi￿ed
craftsmen (in 1865), but restrictions on Jews became more severe after his assassination in
1881. In May 1882 more restrictions were placed on where Jews could live within the Pale
(for instance, they were barred from living in villages), and in 1891 all Jews were expelled
from Moscow and St. Petersburg (Kappeler, 2001, pp. 268-269).15 According to the Census
of 1897, within the Pale Jews formed 72.8% of all those engaged in commerce and 31.4% of
those engaged in crafts and industry.
After the October Revolution and the rise of the Bolsheviks, the economic policy of ￿War
Communism￿lasted from the middle of 1918 when the Civil War broke out, until it was replaced
by the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. War Communism involved forced requisition of
grain and output, and after the currency collapsed, it also involved a commitment to a non-
monetary economy. Private commerce was banned and many large ￿rms were nationalized.
These policies caused immense hardship for many Jews. The liberalization of the economy
with the NEP and the re-introduction of money and the increased freedom to produce and
14As Moses Isserles put it in the 16th century ￿It is prefereable to live on dry bread and peace in Poland than
to remain in better conditions in lands more dangerous for Jews￿(Mendelsohn, 2007, p. 289)
15These laws were in some sense a response to the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 by a terrorist of
Jewish origin and to the subsequent anti-Jewish pogroms.
7trade allowed for some recovery, but the occupational structure of Jewish communities changed
drastically with the introduction of central planning and the ￿rst Five Year Plan in 1927. Many
Jews belonged to economic classes that were supposed to vanish in the transition to a socialist
economy and three types of solutions were foreseen.16 The ￿rst was agricultural settlement
and moving Jews into the rural sector. The second was migration out of the former Pale and
into the interior of Russia. The third was concentration of Jews into the large towns and cities
of the Western Soviet Union where new industrial enterprises had developed along with a new
Soviet bureaucracy and civil service. In practice, it was this third option that dominated and
Beizer and Romanowski (2007, p. 546) sum up the outcome as
￿Commerce, which had held the central place in the lives of the Jews before the
Revolution, was replaced by administrative occupations and professions in technol-
ogy and sciences.￿
The most important conclusion of this section for our research is that the distribution of
the Jewish population in 1941 was largely the result of idiosyncratic historical circumstances
coupled with the anti-Semitism of the Russian state that kept Jews con￿ned to the Pale.17
2.2 The German Occupation and the Holocaust
On June 22, 1941 the German invasion of Russia, ￿Operation Barbarossa￿began.18 Units of
the German army quickly penetrated deep into Soviet territory with Kiev being captured by the
end of September. At the time of the invasion there was no general order which speci￿ed that
all Jews were to be murdered. The ￿Final Solution to the Jewish question￿only really emerged
in October 1941 and began to be implemented in March of 1942 (Browning, 2004, Chapter
9).19 Indeed, it was the ferocity of the murder of Jews in Western Russia which appears to
16See also Levin (1988, Volume 1, Chapters 10 and 11) on this transformation.
17Though other factors may also have had some e⁄ect. For instance, Hosking (1997, p. 33) argues that
the origins of the Pale partially lay with Moscow merchants petitioning the state to be shielded from Jewish
competition.
18Operation Barbarrosa is discussed extensively in all general histories of the Second World War. The most
comprehensive account in English of the military campaigns fought in Russia between 1941 and 1945 is Erickson
(1975, 1983). A recent overview of the nature of the German ￿ Empire￿is Mazower (2008). The best source on
the organization of the German occupation in Russia is Dallin (1988), see also Reitlinger (1960), Schulte (1988),
and Kay (2006). See Berkho⁄ (2004) for a detailed narrative of the German occupation of Ukraine.
19The facts about the planning and implementation of the Holocaust are presented in several standard aca-
demic works with Hilberg (2003) being perhaps the most respected (see also Reitlinger, 1968, Gilbert, 1986,
and Yahil, 1990). Hilberg (2003, pp. 271-390) and Yahil (1990, pp. 253-305) focus on the Soviet Union. See
Gesin (2006), Lower (2005) and Brandon and Lower (2008) for Ukraine. See Ehrenburg and Grossman (2002)
for the most recent English edition of the Black Book, a compendium of Nazi crimes against Jews in the Soviet
Union whose inception dates to 1943. Browning (2004) discusses in detail the evolution of the Final Solution
8have convinced senior Nazis that the total annihilation of European Jews was feasible. As
Browning (2004, p. 532) notes
￿In June 1941 a solution to the Jewish question was still envisioned by the German
leadership in terms of forced resettlement that, though inherently destructive, did
not amount to the systematic mass murder of all Jewish men, women and children.￿
The main groups which emerged to head this mass murder were four Einsatzgruppen, which
each consisted of 3,000 men who would follow closely behind the army front lines and play a
pivotal role in ensuring control over the newly won areas. The Einsatzgruppen were special units
of the Security Police and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) controlled by Reinhard Heydrich. These
units were formed in preparation for Barbarossa (Hilberg, 2003, pp. 287-218/157, Browning,
2004, pp. 225-226 on the composition of these units). Their orders were to eliminate all
Communist cadres, partisans or others who threatened the goals of ￿paci￿cation￿ .20 Though
Jews were identi￿ed as a ￿special danger￿and were to be dealt with ￿more severely￿(Browning,
2004, p. 229), they did not, as yet, have speci￿c orders to systematically kill all Jews.21
Einsatzgruppen were just the spearhead of a much larger contingent of SS which Himmler
anticipated would be key to controlling the newly won colonies. These included 21 battalions
of Order Police and an SS Cavalry brigade, all of which would ultimately be deeply implicated
in the systematic murder of Russian Jews.22
In practice, the mass murder of Jews began on day one of the invasion in Garsden in
Lithuania on June 27. Shortly afterwards at least 2,000 Jews were killed in Bialystok by a
Police Battalion associated with the Wehrmacht apparently at the initiative of junior o¢ cers
(Browning, 2004, pp. 255-256). The killing spread with extraordinary ferocity, a famous
instance being the Babi Yar massacres where over 33,000 Jews were killed outside Kiev on
September 29 and 30th (see Bartov, 2001, on the escalating barbarity of the con￿ ict). By the
end of the July the Einsatzgruppen reported to have killed 63,000 people, 90% of whom were
Jews (Browning, 2004, p. 260). At this stage, however, the massacres were still ￿an incoherent,
locally and regionally varied sequence of measures characterized on the part of German o¢ cials
by increasing violence￿(Browning, 2004, pp. 258-259). As the invasion proceeded the killing
and Chapter 7 focuses on the murder of Jews in the Soviet Union and the role this played in shaping what
would subsequently happen.
20In a much quoted remark, Hitler stated: ￿Naturally, the vast area must be paci￿ed as quickly as possible;
this will happen best by shooting anyone who even looks sideways at us￿(Browning, 2004, p. 266).
21A selection of reports of the Einsatzgruppen have been translated into English by scholars (Arad, Krakowski,
and Spector, 1989).
22One should observe that many citizens of the Soviet Republics collaborated heavily with the Nazis and were
also heavily involved in the murder of Jews.
9intensi￿ed with the move to murdering women and children, and ￿nally the establishment of
the idea that all Jews should be killed. Browning (2004, p. 291) notes that ￿the threshold to
genocide was crossed at the end of August.￿
The territories conquered after June 1941 were administered in di⁄erent ways. The Re-
ich Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, Alfred Rosenberg, was in charge of the
Reichskommissariat Ostland (eventually comprising Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Belorus-
sia), which was formed on July 25 with its capital at Riga as well as the Reichskommissariat
Ukraine, formed on September 1 and eventually comprising roughly Soviet Ukraine west of
the River Dnieper, but excluding Transnistria in the Southwest, which was administered by
the Romanians. The two Reichskommissariate were in turn under Reichkommissars Heinrich
Lohse and Erich Koch. Western Ukraine, which was part of Poland until September 1939, was
administered by the Generalgouvernement of Poland, headed by Hans Frank.23 Finally, the
areas to the east of these zones in Russia were administered by the three army groups of the
Wehrmacht.
The administration of these di⁄erent entities ended up working in quite di⁄erent ways. In
the civilian areas, nominally under the control of Rosenberg, Lohse and Koch operated with
almost total autonomy and typically used their connections with high Nazi o¢ cials to bypass
Rosenberg￿ s orders (Dallin, 1981, pp.123-127 on the antipathy between Rosenberg and Koch,
for instance). To take one example, Nazi administrators generally frowned on indiscriminate
looting of the possessions and property of Jews. However, as Hilberg (2003, p. 363) points
out: ￿The civilian administration approached the con￿scation problem with stubbornness in
the Ostland and with remarkable laxity in Ukraine.￿In addition ￿The administrative structure
evolved by the Army di⁄ered signi￿cantly from that in the Reich Commissariats￿(Dallin, 1981,
p. 95, and see the contrast between Figures 7 and 8 in Dallin, 1981, p. 94 and p. 97). One
speci￿c example is the organization of economic exploitation, such as forced labor.24 In the
civilian areas this followed the chain of command from Rosenberg though Koch and Lohse.
In the areas controlled by the Wehrmacht, however, it was under the direct control of G￿ring
(Hilberg, 2003, p. 357).
The situation in Romanian administered Transnistria also appears to have been very di⁄er-
ent. Though SS and Einsatzgruppen activities did penetrate into Transnistria and executions
of many Jews took place, the consensus view is, as Dallin (1981, p. 90) puts it: ￿Romanian
civil administration ... was extremely lax and ine¢ cient but also much more welcome to the
23See Gross (1979) for a study of the Generalgouvernement.
24Martin Bormann noted ￿￿rst: conquer, second: rule, third: exploit￿(quoted in Dallin, 1981, p. 58).
10population than the repressive system in the neighboring German-held areas￿(see also Ofer,
1993, for a similar view). It is signi￿cant that while in the Nazi held areas of Russia and
Poland close to 100% of the Jews were murdered, only about 17% of Romanian Jews were
killed during the War (Schmelz and Della Pergola, 2007, p. 557, see also Dallin, 1957, on
Odessa, and Braham, 1997).
The fact that Ukraine was administered in such a heterogeneous way by four di⁄erent
entities makes our empirical strategy more di¢ cult to implement. We therefore focus on the
Russian areas of our sample, which were administered only by the Wehrmacht, and only report
some basic results using Ukrainian data.
By the end of 1941, with the German army stalled outside Moscow and Leningrad, at
the end of what Hilberg calls the ￿First Sweep,￿perhaps 800,000 Jews had been murdered￿
about 4,200 per day (Browning, 2004, p. 244). Perhaps as many as 1,500,000 Jews may
have escaped to the east (Altshuler, 1993, Hilberg, 2003, pp. 294-295).25 Many of those
remaining behind German lines were forced into nascent Jewish ghettos, where there were
more systematic attempts to register Jews and to press them into forced labor. The ￿Second
sweep￿began in the spring of 1942 and went on throughout the year ending in October 1942
with the destruction of the remaining ghettos in Ostland. On October 27, Himmler ordered
the destruction of the last ghetto in Belarus at Pi· nsk (Hilberg, 2003, p. 381). Most Jews who
were in the Soviet Union at the start of the con￿ ict were killed in the Soviet Union by the end
of 1942 and did not remain alive to be transported to the Death Camps (see Hilberg, 2003,
Table 9-8, pp. 893-894).
The surrender of the remnants of the 6th Army at Stalingrad on January 31, 1943 marked
the turning point of the German invasion. In the spring of 1943 the Russian army advanced in
the South, and in July, it decisively defeated the German army at the battle of Kursk. By the
end of 1943 the Germans had been pushed back across the Dnieper and away from Leningrad.
By April 1944 Russian armies controlled nearly all of Ukraine except for the far West and by
December of that year Germany had lost control of all of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states
and Poland east of Warsaw.
2.3 Soviet Development and Jewish Relations After the War
In the immediate post War period there was something of a recrudescence of Jewish culture
and identity in the Soviet Union, though this was in the context of the commitment of Stalin to
25Many were evacuated because they played an important role in Soviet industry which was moved east as
the invasion began. See Barber and Harrison (1991) on the organization of the Soviet wartime economy.
11not distinguish between the su⁄ering of Jews and other Soviet citizens in the ￿Great patriotic
War￿ . Though many war memorials were built, none speci￿cally mentioned the Holocaust or
the fact that Jews were singled out for extermination.26
Things changed dramatically in 1948, however, when Stalin launched an intensive anti-
Jewish campaign￿ the ￿Black Years￿ .27 The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee which during the
War had raised money abroad for the Soviet Union, was disbanded and its leaders arrested.
They were executed on August 12, 1952 (Beizer and Romanowski, 2007, p. 553). In January
1953 the government announced a plot by a group of prominent doctors to kill government
leaders. Following these events, Jews were discriminated against extensively, removed from
government positions and positions in the army, and quotas were applied to the entry of Jews
into universities. This campaign only eased in intensity after Stalin￿ s death in March 1953, but
even after this date, it persisted to a signi￿cant extent. For example, the number of synagogues
fell from 450 to 96 between 1956 and 1963 (Beizer and Romanowski, 2007, p. 556). Possibly
in response to this pressure the number of Jews recorded in the 1970 census, 2,151,000, was
less than in the 1959 census, 2,268,000. Census enumerators did not ask to see the passport of
the people they recorded and it is possible that in consequence the number of Jews was under-
reported (see Beizer and Romanowski, 2007, p. 555, on the distinction between ￿census Jews￿
and ￿passport Jews￿ ). The period after 1948 therefore is characterized by quite systematic
anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. The absolute number of Jews continued to fall with each
successive census, and by the late 1970s there was a large increase in emigration, primarily to
Israel.
3 The Data
The Soviet Union collected an extensive census in 1939, listing the distribution of Jews by
oblast, their social status, and educational attainment. These data enable us to construct
our ex ante measure of the potential impact of the Holocaust. We relate this impact of
the Holocaust to contemporary political and economic outcomes, which are predominantly
coded from o¢ cial Russian statistics. The 1939 census combined with information from post
World War II censuses also allows us to examine the consequences for social structure.28 The
26The six volume o¢ cial Soviet history of the Second World War published between 1964 and 1966 does not
refer to Jews, anti-Semitism or the Holocaust (Fox, 2004, p. 423).
27See Pinkus (1984) for an overview of the 1948-1967 period. Levin (1988, Volume 2) treats the period since
1952 in detail.
28Our main sample excludes the Baltics, Belarus, Ukraine, and the states of the Caucuses. The Baltic states
of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (as well as large parts of present-day Belarus and Ukraine) were not part
of the Soviet Union between the two Wars, and so we cannot conduct a before and after comparison. We
12government classi￿ed the social status of individuals according to their profession (occupation),
so we can construct a measure of the middle class without reference to individual or household
income. The later Soviet censuses in 1959, 1970, 1979 and 1989 allow us to track the evolution
of the Soviet social structure and education over time and to assess the persistence of the initial
shock caused by the Holocaust. To the best of our knowledge, these data on social structure
have never been collected or used systematically before.
3.1 Historical Data
The Soviet ￿all union￿population census of 1939 was completed immediately before the out-
break of the Second World War and is therefore well-suited for the purposes of this study. It
was declassi￿ed only during the 1990s and has not been studied extensively.29 The detailed
records contain information on the fraction of Jews and the social structure at the oblast level,
which we coded from original archival material. The 1939 census has been surrounded by some
controversy (Wheatcroft and Davies, 1994b, and see also Wheatcroft, 1990, and Wheatcroft
and Davies, 1994a, for general discussions of the reliability of Soviet data from this period).
The previous census in 1937 had been interrupted and eventually abandoned while still prelim-
inary and the responsible o¢ cials were arrested and subsequently executed by Stalin￿ s personal
order. The reason for this is that while the o¢ cial population ￿gure for 1933 was 165.7 million,
the 1937 count suggested that total Soviet population was just 162 million (Wheatcroft and
Davies, 1994b, p. 71). The obvious conclusion to draw was that this fall was a consequence
of the death toll resulting from Stalin￿ s collectivization policies earlier in the decade. Stalin
ordered another census and the 1939 census returned a total population of 170.2 million. In
fact the total number of people counted in the census was 167.3 million and the authorities
more or less arbitrarily increased the total by 2.8 million (Wheatcroft and Davies, 1994b, p.
71).
Scholars di⁄er on census is more reliable and also we do not know to what extent the
aggregate in￿ ation in the 1939 census was distributed into the regional totals (as opposed to
just in￿ ating the headline total). Knowing which of the censuses is more accurate is di¢ cult
since the 1937 one was carried out in conditions of political turmoil and never satisfactorily
dropped Belarus and the Caucuses because of problems in getting comparable outcome data at a su¢ cient level
of disaggregation for the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Throughout, we also drop Moscow and
St. Petersburg, both because there have been major changes in their boundaries and also because political and
economic development in these two cities may be di¢ cult to compare with the rest of Russia. Therefore, the
oblast Moskowskaya does not include the city of Moscow.
29For coding our data we used one of two existing micro￿lm copies of the original archival material. It consists
of over 300 reels of hand-written volumes that were originally used to compile the results of the census.
13completed, and the 1939 one was done in somewhat calmer times but carrying a possible dis-
tortion of unknown size in the regional totals.30 Some argue for the relative accuracy of the
1939 census (e.g., Zhiromskaia, 1992). Altshuler (1998) preforms additional consistency checks,
focusing on the statistics for the Jewish population. In particular, he compares implied popu-
lation growth rates between censuses and ￿nds that the 1939 count of the Jewish population
is indeed consistent.31 In our empirical analysis, we use the 1939 census. Appendix Table 4
shows that our results are robust to using alternative data from the 1937 census when these
are available. For the variables we focus on, there appear to be few di⁄erences between the
censuses; for example, the correlation between the proportion Jews in the population in 1937
and 1939 is 0.959.
In total, we have data for 278 cities, 76 of which were occupied by the Germans. Our other
main unit of observation is the oblast, of which there are 83 in Russia today.32 We drop the
Jewish Autonomous Oblast in the east of Siberia which was created by Stalin in 1934 as part
of his nationality policy (see Weinberg, 1988). When we exclude oblasts for which we have
no data on the percentage of Jews in 1939, we have a total of 48 oblasts, 11 of which were
occupied. Oblasts are themselves embedded within larger administrative areas called districts.
We coded a dummy variable for whether or not a city or oblast was occupied by the Nazis
using o¢ cial Russian sources and detailed maps of the military con￿ ict on Soviet soil between
1941 and 1945. We classi￿ed an oblast as occupied if the average urban citizen in our city-level
dataset lived under German occupation for at least 6 months. Our results are robust to various
ways of coding this variable (see Appendix Table 1 for details).
Our estimates of the Jewish population in Russian oblasts are constructed as follows. For
1939 we have the exact number of economically active Jews in each city and oblast. We obtain
an estimate of the total number of Jews by assuming that Jews had the same participation
rate in the labor force as the average population and then dividing the number of economically
active individuals by the participation rate.
We have less detailed data for 1959 than for 1939. Speci￿cally, the total population of a
given ethnic group in 1959 is only published if the group is one of the most populous in the
region. This means that we lack data on the Jewish population where there were relatively
few Jews and we have to make certain assumptions in order to estimate the change in the
30Personal correspondence with Mark Harrison and Bob Davies.
31The 1939 census was never extended to the territories annexed under the Molotov￿ Ribbentrop Pact in the
same year.
32In the following we refer to all types of ￿ federal subjects￿of Russia as oblasts. These include republics,
autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, and krais.
14Jewish population between 1939 and 1959 attributable to the Holocaust.33 In particular, if no
1959 number is available, we use the number given in the 1970 census, adjusting for Jewish
population growth within the district. If data on Jews are available in the 1939 census but
neither in 1959 nor in 1970 and the oblast was invaded, then we assume that the entire Jewish
population fell victim to the Holocaust. Outside the occupied area if no data are available
after 1939, then we assume that the Holocaust had no impact on the Jewish population.
In the occupied oblasts, the Jewish population diminished by over 39% on average. The
oblasts directly adjacent to those that were invaded, on the other hand, reported increases of
Jewish population, albeit typically from a very low level. Appendix Table 6 reports these esti-
mates in detail. For Russian cities we have information on the percentage of Jewish population
only for 1939, which is taken from Altshuler (1993a).
Soviet censuses (1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989) also include oblast-level data on
social status, which we use to investigate whether changes in social structure could be at the
root of the long-run e⁄ects of the Holocaust. The Soviet Union classi￿ed all of its citizens into
one of four categories: ￿blue collar workers￿(Rabochie), ￿white collar workers￿(Sluzhashchie),
￿collective farmers￿ (Kolkhozniki), and ￿private farmers￿ (Krest￿ iane Edinolichniki). This
classi￿cation does not depend on the level of income, but on the profession of the individual
(the source of income). This enables us to construct the relative size of the middle class based
on occupation rather than the level of wealth or income. For 1939 we also have information on
the number of handicraftsmen and individuals in ￿liberal professions￿ , such as physicians and
lawyers, which were considered to be subgroups of the ￿white collar workers￿category in later
census years. The 1939 census also splits these categories up by industry, which enables us work
with a more precise notion of middle class in part of our empirical analysis by constructing a
￿core middle class￿variable consisting of individuals in the liberal professions, handicraftsmen,
and white collar workers who work in the trade, education, and health care sectors.
According to the 1939 census, 14.99% of the Russian population held white collar jobs,
2.85% were Handicraftsmen and 0.02% were members of the liberal professions. In addition,
31.62% were classi￿ed as workers and 50.51% derived their primary income from agriculture
(see the right panel of Figure 1). In the history of the Russian Empire, Jews were traditionally
barred from direct involvement in agriculture. In the Jewish Pale, they therefore tended to pro-
33It is also possible that the increase in anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union between the 1939 and 1959 censuses
led to an increased incidence of Jews falsifying their identity in 1959 (and increased discrepancy between ￿census
Jews￿and ￿passport Jews￿ ). Interestingly, however, Altshuler￿ s (1987) surveys of Soviet immigrants to Israel on
their behavior in interviews for the 1959 and 1970 counts indicate that virtually all of the respondents answered
the question about their religious identity truthfully and that they did not feel pressure to conceal their true
identity.
15vide services for the agricultural sector. During the modernization of the country, particularly
after 1927, there were large changes in the occupational structure. Nevertheless, the Jewish
population remained predominantly in white collar occupations.34 The left panel of Figure 1
depicts the social makeup of the Jewish population in 1939. The bias towards white collar
occupations is very strong: 66.81% of Jews held white collar jobs, 8.51% were in Handicrafts,
and 0.20% in the ￿Liberal Professions￿ . On average, 2.81% of the Russian (core) middle class
were Jewish. In oblasts as Smolensk, Briansk and Rostov they made up 6-9% of the middle
class (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for details).
We also used the Soviet censuses to construct data on educational attainment at each
date. We did this by taking the total number of people who had graduated from high school
and the total number who had graduated from university as our dependent variables (always
controlling for total population). Jews also made up a sizable share of the emerging educated
class, although they constituted only a relatively small share of the overall population.
3.2 Main Variables
Our ￿rst measure of how severely a city or an oblast was a⁄ected by the Holocaust is de￿ned
as
Pex ante




where Ni is the Nazi occupation dummy for city or oblast i, J39;i is the total number of Jews
in 1939 in the city or oblast, and L39;i is the population in 1939. We refer to Pex ante
i as
the potential impact of the Holocaust. The advantage of this measure is that it only uses
information on the ex ante (before the Holocaust) distribution of Jews across cities or oblasts.
At the oblast level where we have detailed information on the social composition of the
population as well as the number of Jews after World War II we are able to construct more
re￿ned measures of the e⁄ect of the Holocaust on the size of the middle class. We discuss these
in Section 5.
3.3 Contemporary Outcomes and Control Variables
For our sample of 278 Russian cities, we have two economic outcomes, one is city population
which comes from the Russian censuses and the other is average wages in 2002 from the
EastView Universal Database of Statistical Publications, an electronic resource which collects
34Botticini and Eckstein (2005) argue that the occupational specialization of Jews stemmed not from formal
restrictions but rather from the fact that their high levels of human capital, induced by the requirement that they
could read the scriptures, gave them natural comparative advantages (in mercantile activities) and disadvantages
(in farming). The exact cause of this specialization is not important for the interpretation of our results.
16government statistics for the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries. The only
political outcome variable we have available at the city level is the percentage of votes for
Communist candidates in the 1999 Duma election. The Communist party won 24.3% of the
vote in this election and was the largest party in the Duma with 90 seats.35 Here we only
use data where the electoral district for the Duma coincides with a city and drop the 204
observations where cities were part of a larger electoral district.
For oblasts we are able to construct a richer set of contemporaneous outcomes. The eco-
nomic outcomes we consider are GDP per capita and average wages from the Russian statistical
o¢ ce￿ s yearly volumes on oblast-level indicators.36 The ￿rst political outcome we consider is
the share of votes in the 1991 referendum in favor of the preservation of the Soviet Union. The
March 11, 1991 referendum was orchestrated by Gorbachev in a last-minute attempt to stop
the separatist movements in the Baltic and other member republics.37 The results of this vote
provide us with valuable data on the regional variation in support of political and economic
reform (with those supporting reform voting against the referendum question). We also use
data on the vote share for Communist candidates in the 1999 Duma election at the oblast
level, which is the same variable we use at the city level.
We further coded two variables that control for the relocation of defense-related industry
during and immediately after World War II. For this purpose we obtained a comprehensive
database compiled by Dexter and Rodionov (2009), which lists 21,353 defense factories, re-
search, and design establishments that operated in the USSR between 1918-1989. We are able
to determine the present-day location of 17,914 establishments and of 1558 establishments
which reportedly moved from one location to another at some point in their history. Based on
this information we construct two control variables: The ￿rst is the growth in the total num-
ber of establishments in a given city or oblast between 1939 and 1959. The second variable
35The 1999 Duma election is the only national ballot for which we were able to obtain constituency-level
data. We added to the votes of the main Communist Party the votes of a small splinter communist party called
the Communists of the USSR. For this reason we refer to the ￿ communist vote￿or the votes for ￿ communist
candidates￿ .
36We obtained these numbers from the East View Universal Database (Series 10.1, 4.1 and 4.3 respectively
in Goskomstat Rossii, 2003). We use the most recent available data, which are for the year 2002, and convert
the ruble values into their PPP dollar equivalents.
37We obtained the results of the 1991 referendum from the Centre for Russian Studes Data at Norsk Utenrik-
spolitisk Institutt. The 1991 referendum question was: ￿Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as
a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedoms of all nationalities
will be fully guaranteed?￿Although 71% of Russian voters responded ￿yes￿to this question above, they did not
stop the breakup of the Soviet Union. The vote had a turnout of 75%. Although the campaigns for and against
the preservation of the Soviet Union were not on equal footing, independent international observers deemed the
ballot itself to be fair and found no evidence of tampering (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
1991, p. 15).
17measures the extent of defense industry relocation during World War II by taking the growth
rate in the number of establishments which are reported to have been relocated at some time
in their history. In each case we set the growth rate equal to zero if the city or oblast hosts no
establishments in the defense industry in both 1939 and 1959.
Finally, we use o¢ cial data on the volume of oil and gas output in 2002 at the oblast level,
which is available from the EastView database. We use this variable as a proxy for natural
resources, which are likely to be an important contributor to regional economic performance
in Russia, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The ￿rst three columns present data on cities and the
last three on oblasts. In each case we separate the sample into all cities (or oblasts), those that
were occupied by the Germans at any time, and those that were occupied and had a higher
percentage of Jewish population in 1939 than the median occupied city or oblast. The ￿rst
row of column 1 gives the mean and the standard deviation of city population in 1939, while
the second column gives the mean and standard deviation of city population in areas that
were occupied. One can see that cities in occupied areas were considerably smaller, though
those shown in column 3, with a high Jewish population, are closer in size to the average city.
Row 4 shows that occupied cities also had a greater fraction of Jewish population, while row
7 shows that these cities are considerably smaller today (in fact, the gap between all occupied
cities and those with a high Jewish population has almost closed). Notably, occupied cities
and particularly those with high Jewish population have lower average wages (row 10) and
voted in greater numbers for communist candidates in 1999 (row 12).
Looking at the sample of oblasts we see similar patterns. Occupied oblasts had lower levels
of urbanization in 1939 and in 1989, and had lower GDP per capita in 2002. Occupied oblasts
with higher Jewish population had somewhat higher urbanization and percent middle class
than other occupied oblasts in 1939, but once again we see that the gap between all occupied
oblasts and those with a high Jewish population has closed by 1989.
The last three lines of Table 1 give the average number of establishments in the defense
industry for cities and oblasts in 1939, 1945, and 1989. The numbers suggest that there was
a shift in the defense industry from occupied to non-occupied cities and oblasts during World
War II, but that this shift was not permanent, with occupied oblasts hosting 60% of the average
oblast￿ s number of defense establishments in 1939, 43% in 1945, and 73% in 1989.38
38This ￿nding is in line with the literature where Rodgers (1974) ￿nds that by 1965 part of the shift in
18The fact that there seem to be signi￿cant di⁄erences in levels of urbanization and di⁄erent
social structures before the war between occupied and non-occupied oblasts in Russia suggests
that they may have been on di⁄erential political and economic trends. To deal with this
possibility we use a variety of strategies. First, we attempt to control for pre-war characteristics
in our main speci￿cations. Second, we exploit data from the 1926 census to check whether
cities and oblasts that were more a⁄ected by the Holocaust exhibit di⁄erential growth between
1926 and 1939. Finally, we examine variation within occupied areas using our city level dataset
(we cannot do this with oblast level data because we only have data on 11 occupied oblasts).
4 The Impact of the Holocaust on Cities
We ￿rst look at the potential e⁄ects of the Holocaust on city population and then turn to
economic and political outcomes. Our econometric model is
logUt;i = ￿tPex ante
i + ￿t logU1939;i + X0
i￿t + ￿t;i; (2)
where logUt;i denotes the logarithm of population of city i in post-war census year t, where
t 2 f1959;1970;1979;1989g; Xi is a vector of city-level covariates, which always includes a
constant, a dummy for Nazi occupation, and the main e⁄ect of the fraction of the population
of Jewish origin in 1939. The coe¢ cient of interest is ￿t and measures the potential impact of
the Holocaust on the size of the city in year t (variable Pex ante
i is computed as indicated in (1)).
Since logU1939;i is included on the right hand side, (2) is similar to a ￿xed e⁄ects model with
a lagged dependent variable in a panel with two dates with the key right hand side variable
being the interaction between Pex ante
i and a post-year dummy. The error term ￿t;i captures
all omitted in￿ uences, including any deviations from linearity. Equation (2) will consistently






0. In what follows, we control for available city-level covariates to check that these are not
responsible for the correlations we report.
4.1 The E⁄ects on City Population
We begin by examining the full sample of cities. Table 2 reports OLS regressions of equation (2)
for t = 1989. Throughout, all standard errors are robust against arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
All columns except column 6 report unweighted results. In addition, all columns except column
5 use district ￿xed e⁄ects (we have data for cities in 7 out of 11 Russian districts), and column
industrial activity was already reversed.
194 uses oblast ￿xed e⁄ects (we have data for cities in 57 out of 83 Russian oblasts, which
aggregate to districts). We focus on speci￿cations with district ￿xed e⁄ects as one third of
oblasts contain fewer than three observations.
Column 1 shows an estimated coe¢ cient for the potential impact of the Holocaust of ￿0:077
(s.e.=0.031). This suggests that cities which were potentially more a⁄ected by the Holocaust
are signi￿cantly smaller 50 years later, in 1989. The coe¢ cient estimate implies a potentially
large e⁄ect of the severity of the Holocaust on city size.39 In particular, according to this
estimate, an occupied city with a 1% share of Jewish population in 1939 should be 7.7%
smaller in 1989 than it would otherwise be. The share of the city population that is of Jewish
origin is typically small (it is on average 2.01% for occupied cities and 0.45% for non-occupied
cities). In this light, perhaps a more informative way of expressing this quantitative magnitude
is to note that the average occupied city should be about 15% smaller in 1989 than it would
have been had it escaped German occupation. This is a sizable e⁄ect that cannot be accounted
for by the direct impact of the Holocaust. One possible interpretation is that the Holocaust
may have caused a divergence in the long-run economic and social development paths of the
a⁄ected cities. In the next section we suggest a possible channel for such divergence, which
relates to the signi￿cant weakening of the middle class in these areas. Naturally, the coe¢ cient
estimate might also partly re￿ ect omitted factors, though controlling for the covariates we have
available does not typically a⁄ect the magnitude by much.
Note also that column 1 includes district ￿xed e⁄ects and three basic covariates (which are
included in all of our other speci￿cations as well): a dummy variable indicating whether or not
the city was occupied by the Germans, the percentage of the population that was Jewish in
1939, and the logarithm of city population in 1939. The ￿rst two of these are included to ensure
that Pex ante
i does not capture the direct e⁄ects of German occupation or of having a larger
Jewish population. The third, logU39;i, controls for historical di⁄erences in the size of the city
dating back to before World War II. As expected, its coe¢ cient is statistically indistinguishable
from 1, which is consistent with the presence of permanent di⁄erences in size across cities. The
coe¢ cient on the German occupation dummy is positive and signi￿cant, which is contrary to
expectations, but this result is not robust as shown by the other columns in the table.
Column 2 adds additional geographical variables, the latitude and longitude of the city.
The coe¢ cient on Pex ante
i hardly changes, but it becomes more precise, so that it is now
39It should be noted that there is considerable colinearity between the potential impact of the Holocaust
and percent Jewish population in 1939. If we run the same regression without including the main e⁄ect of the
percent Jewish population in 1939, the impact of the Holocaust is estimated to be smaller, -0.032 (s.e.= 0.009).
20statistically signi￿cant at 1%.
A potential concern is that the cities with a high Jewish population and occupied cities
were also a⁄ected by Stalin￿ s ￿scorched earth￿policy, which destroyed the infrastructure in
the areas about to fall into German hands. At the same time, war-related industries in these
areas were relocated further to the east, thus potentially also a⁄ecting our ￿control￿cities. To
directly deal with this issue, in column 3 we control for growth of defense industry between
1939 and 1959 (as described above) and also separately control for the relocation of defense
industry between 1939 and 1959. Column 4 includes the same variables together with oblast
￿xed e⁄ects. In both cases, the relocation variable is signi￿cant, but has little e⁄ect on our
coe¢ cient of interest. In particular, the coe¢ cient on Pex ante
i is ￿0:068 and continues to be
signi￿cant at 1% in both cases.
Column 5 repeats the same speci￿cations as column 3, but now without the district ￿xed
e⁄ects. The coe¢ cient on Pex ante
i is slightly smaller, ￿0:048, but its standard error also falls
and the estimate continues to be statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Finally, column 6 reports a weighted regression (weights given by population in 1939). This
is motivated by the fact that some of the cities experiencing signi￿cant changes in population
were relatively small. The coe¢ cient of interest is now somewhat smaller, -0.043, but the
standard error declines further, so the potential impact of the Holocaust is still marginally
signi￿cant at the 5% level.
The basic results from Table 2 column 3 are shown graphically in Figure 2. The slope of the
regression line in the left panel corresponds to the regression in column 3 of Table 2. This ￿gure
also shows that one city, Derbent, appears as an outlier because it had a disproportionately
large Jewish community before the war (22%) and was never occupied by the Germans. The
speci￿cation in the right panel excludes Derbent and returns a larger coe¢ cient of -0.199
(s.e.=0.055).40 As a more systematic check for the e⁄ect of outliers, we run a robust regression
(according to terminology used by STATA) in which observations with a Cook￿ s D value of
more than one are dropped and weights are iteratively calculated based on the residuals of
weighted least square regressions. The robust estimate is larger than the OLS estimate with a
coe¢ cient of -.185 (s.e.=0.048).
Table 3 reports the results of a simple falsi￿cation exercise and investigates the timing and
robustness of the e⁄ects reported in Table 2. The same covariates as in column 3 of Table 2 are
included throughout this table and in the following tables, but are not reported to save space.
40Without Derbent, Mytishchi appears as an outlier. If both of them are dropped, the coe¢ cient estimate is
a little larger and still highly signi￿cant, -0.224 (s.e. = 0.063).
21Column 1 in Panel A uses log city population in 1939 as the dependent variable and controls
for log city population in 1926 on the right hand side. The coe¢ cient on the potential impact
of the Holocaust variable, Pex ante
i , is negative, though small relative to the estimates in Table
2 and far from statistically signi￿cant (-0.018, s.e.=0.040). In Panel B, we perform the same
falsi￿cation exercise in the subsample of occupied cities, and now the coe¢ cient estimate is
positive and again insigni￿cant. This evidence is reassuring that there were no systematic or
signi￿cant pre-trends before German occupation.41
Columns 2-4 in Panel A use the basic model from column 3 of Table 2 and investigate the
timing of the e⁄ect of Pex ante
i on city population (thus column 4 of this table is identical to
column 3 of Table 2). The results show that the e⁄ect is negative and signi￿cant in 1959 and
that it grows over time. This pattern suggests that the Holocaust may have induced a long-
lasting, divergent trend on the a⁄ected cities. It is also consistent with the fact that the 1959
populations of occupied cities were likely a⁄ected directly by war and German occupation, thus
the potential latent e⁄ects resulting from the Holocaust may only exhibit themselves over time.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that this pattern may also re￿ ect other factors not
captured by our covariates.
Column 5 reports the results from a version of our baseline model where the logarithm of
city population in 1926 is used as an instrument for the log of city population in 1939. Since
our model is equivalent to a ￿xed e⁄ects model with a lagged dependent variable, there may be
a mechanical bias in the coe¢ cient of interest. Instrumenting the lagged dependent variable
with its own lag ensures consistency (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). The estimate in column 5
is, reassuringly, very similar to the OLS estimate (shown next to it in column 4).
Panel B reports estimates of equation (2) using only occupied cities.42 This has the ad-
vantage of limiting the sample to a potentially more homogeneous set of cities that have all
su⁄ered the destruction caused by German occupation. Column 4 in this panel corresponds
to our baseline speci￿cation, but with the sample consisting of only occupied cities. The co-
e¢ cient estimate on Pex ante
i is now smaller, but still marginally statistically signi￿cant at the
5% level, -0.025 (s.e.=0.014). This coe¢ cient estimate implies that an occupied city with a 1%
share of Jewish population in 1939 should be 2.5% smaller in 1989, which is about one third of
41One may still be concerned that, even though there is no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect, the sign of the
estimate is negative and its magnitude is about a third of our baseline estimate (column 3 in Table 2 or column
4 in this table). Nevertheless, this is not a consistent pattern. The sign is reversed in Panel B when we focus on
occupied cities, and the sign also ￿ ips (while the estimate is always statistically insigni￿cant) when we perform
falsi￿cation exercises for oblasts in Section 5.
42Again all of the same covariates are included, but since the sample is limited to occupied cities, there is
naturally no occupation dummy and no main e⁄ect of percent Jewish population in 1939.
22the corresponding estimate, 7.7% in the full sample of cities. Figure 3 shows this relationship
graphically. While some cities are far from the regression line, none of these outliers seem
to be driving the results. For example, dropping the outlier city Nevel￿leads to a coe¢ cient
estimate of -0.024 (s.e.=0.014). Furthermore, the same robust regression procedure as above
yields a similar, albeit statistically insigni￿cant, coe¢ cient of -0.023 (s.e.=0.017).
4.2 Political and Economic Outcomes
Tables 2 and 3 show a di⁄erential pattern of population growth across cities which were a⁄ected
di⁄erentially by the Holocaust. More central for our focus are the potential e⁄ects of the
Holocaust on political and economic variables. Our interpretation, which will be ￿ eshed out
further below, is that in places where the Holocaust destroyed the Jewish middle class, social
and economic development, even under communist rule, was considerably delayed; and this
should exhibit itself in terms of more adverse outcomes for economic development and less
political development today. We proxy for political development with the support for non-
communist candidates in the 1999 Duma elections. While many Russian Jews and other
intellectuals were involved with the communist party at the early stages of the Bolshevik
Revolution, by the 1990s the middle class and intellectuals were among the primary constituents
of political and economic reform.
Table 4 investigates this relationship by looking at the correlation between the potential
impact of the Holocaust and the share of votes for communist candidates in the 1999 Duma
election and average wages in 2002. Other variables we have at the oblast level are not available
at the city level. Moreover, we only have these two variables for a sample of 74 and 88 cities
respectively.43 Panel A reports the results for the share of votes (in logs) and Panel B for
average wage in 2002 (also in logs). The regression equations are the same as equation (2)
except for the change in the left hand side variable. In particular, all speci￿cations contain
district ￿xed e⁄ects and control for latitude and longitude. All speci￿cations except those in
column 1 also control for growth and relocation of the defense industry.
Columns 1-4 of Panel A repeat the same speci￿cations as in Table 2 columns 2, 3, 5 and 6
for the vote share of communist candidates. In all cases, the potential impact of the Holocaust
has a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect (at less than 1%). For example, in column 1
the coe¢ cient estimate is 0.110 (s.e.=0.025). This implies that cities more severely a⁄ected
by the Holocaust have signi￿cantly greater support for communist candidates and can thus be
43When we repeat the regressions in Table 2 for this restricted sample, we ￿nd a negative but statistically
insigni￿cant relationship.
23taken to be more opposed to political reform more than 50 years after the end of the war. The
estimate implies that a one percentage point higher share of Jewish population in 1939 in an
occupied city is associated with an 11% in increase in the vote share for communist candidates.
Column 5 includes the change in the population of the city between 1939 and 1959 and
the interaction between this variable and the German occupation dummy as additional control
variables. The change in population between these dates should be a good proxy for the severity
of the general loss of life caused by Nazi occupation. Thus, this variable and its interaction
with the occupation dummy constitute a useful control against the potential e⁄ects of other
destructive implications of Nazi occupation. We did not include such controls in Tables 2 and
3, since there the left hand side variable is also the change in city population (either at the same
date or at subsequent dates). In Table 4, the inclusion of these controls has little e⁄ect on the
coe¢ cient on the potential impact of the Holocaust, and interestingly, the change in population
between 1939 and 1959 and its interaction with the occupation dummy are insigni￿cant. This
pattern is consistent with the view that changes in the composition of the population, rather
than the shock to the level of the population, may have played a more important role in the
long-run development of these cities.
Column 6 reports the same regression as in column 3, except that it drops Smolensk,
which is a signi￿cant cluster point (particularly in the average wage regressions reported in
Panel B, see Figures 4 and 5). In this case, the coe¢ cient on the potential impact of the
Holocaust variable becomes larger and more signi￿cant. Using the same robust regression
procedure described above, the estimated coe¢ cient is 0.117 (s.e.=0.036). Finally, columns 7
and 8 report regressions for the subsample of occupied cities (for which we have data on the
communist vote share), with and without Smolensk. The sample sizes are only 18 and 17.
Nevertheless, the estimated e⁄ects are still signi￿cant, though considerably smaller.
Panel B reports the same regressions with average wage in 2002 as dependent variable.
The coe¢ cient estimates are uniformly negative, but not signi￿cant at the 5% level, except in
columns 5 and 6 (marginally so in columns 2 and 8). This means that the potential impact
of the Holocaust on average wages is stronger and statistically signi￿cant when control for the
ex-post population change and when we exclude Smolensk, which is now a more signi￿cant
outlier. In a robust regression the e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant with a coe¢ cient estimate
of 0.128 (s.e.=0.026).
245 Impact of the Holocaust on Oblasts and the Middle Class
The evidence presented in the previous section shows historical correlations between the Holo-
caust on the one hand and long-run growth of city population and electoral outcomes on the
other. In this section, we investigate the robustness of these relationships by looking at oblast-
level data. At the oblast level, we have access to additional outcome variables and covariates
as well as to detailed information on industry and occupation of Jews and non-Jews before the
German invasion, which will enable us to investigate some possible channels that may link the
Holocaust to large and persistent di⁄erences in economic, social and political outcomes.
5.1 Jews and the Russian Social Structure Before the War
Table 5 provides a detailed account of the role of Jews in the Russian economy before the
outbreak of World War II: It gives the percentage of the total workforce which was Jewish for
each social group and industry in 1939. The ￿rst three lines of each panel give the percentages
for occupations which are classi￿ed as ￿white collar￿in the subsequent USSR censuses: the
liberal professions (this category includes individuals who are engaged in some form of intellec-
tual activity, such as writers or physicians, who are not typically on the sta⁄ of any particular
institution), handicraftsmen, and white collar workers (employees who are not mainly engaged
in physical labor). Columns 1-7 give the split up by industry, and column 8 gives the total
percentage of the workforce in each occupation that was Jewish. Panel A shows the average
percentage for the 6 oblasts which were occupied by the Germans during World War II and had
a higher Jewish population than the median occupied oblast. Jews made up a small minority
of 0.89% of the population of these oblasts. Nevertheless, they played a central role in occu-
pations that are classi￿ed as white collar in the USSR censuses after 1939. For example, Jews
constituted 11.2% of those working in ￿Liberal Professions￿ , 7.4% of the handicraftsmen and
5.3% of the white collar workers. The picture becomes even more striking when we focus on
the role of Jews in what we call the ￿core￿middle class; those working in white collar occupa-
tions within the trade, education, and health care sectors. In trade (column 1), Jews made up
26.7% of the handicraftsmen and 9.9% of the white collar workers. A similar picture emerges
for education and health care (columns 2 and 3). Most strikingly, in the health care sector,
68.2% of those in the liberal professions (presumably physicians) were Jewish. Moreover, Jews
also played a central role in the government sector, where 12.9% of those working in liberal
professions were Jewish. Given these ￿ndings, it seems plausible that the persecution and
displacement of Jews during the Holocaust may have had long-lasting e⁄ects on the societies
25left behind; not because Jews constituted a large share of the population, but because they
constituted a large share of key strata of society which are essential constituents of economic
and political development.
Panel B shows the same set of results for all occupied oblasts, where Jews still constitute a
large share of the middle class occupations in trade, education and health care, with 16.8% of
the handicraftsmen in trade and 41.7% of those in the liberal professions in health care being
Jewish. Panel C gives the oblast averages for all of Russia. The percentages given in this panel
are uniformly much smaller, re￿ ecting of course the fact that most Jews lived in western parts
of Russia before the outbreak of World War II. Appendix Table 2 reports the percentage of
the total workforce working in each occupation and industry for comparison.
5.2 The Impact on the Middle Class
We next investigate the relationship between the impact of the Holocaust and the size of the
middle class across oblasts. More speci￿cally, in Table 6, we estimate the model
logMt;i = ￿tPi + ￿t logM39;i + X0
i￿t + ￿t;i; (3)
where Pi denotes various di⁄erent measures of the impact of the Holocaust (starting with
Pex ante
i ), logMt;i is the log of the number of middle class individuals (those in white collar
occupations as de￿ned by the USSR censuses after 1939) in oblast i and year t. The covariate
vector always contains log total population in the current year, log urban population in 1939,
the dummy for German occupation, the main e⁄ect of the fraction of the population that was of
Jewish origin in 1939, degrees longitude and latitude of the oblast capital, controls for defense
industry growth and relocation, as well as our measure of oil and gas production in 2002, and
a constant term. Controlling for current population is particularly important, since otherwise
equation (3) would not be informative about the relative size of the middle class.44 We take
time period t to be 1989 (Panel A), 1979 (Panel B), and 1970 (Panel C). All speci￿cations
except 1, 3 and 6 are weighted with population in 1939.45 To save space, we only report the
44An alternative strategy is to estimate an equation like (3) with share of the middle class as the dependent
variable and share of the middle class in 1939 on the right-hand side. The disadvantage of this is that our esti-
mates of rural population in di⁄erent oblasts are less reliable than other data, thus the share of the middle class
in 1939 introduces additional measurement error on the right-hand side. In addition, including log population
on the right-hand side directly allows for a more ￿ exible relationship between the size of the middle class and
total population.
45At the oblast level, the weighted speci￿cations are particularly useful for two reasons. First, because we
are able to re-weight the 1939 population to match contemporary boundaries using separate urban and rural
weights in larger, but not in many of the smaller, oblasts (see Data Appendix); the 1939 data for these smaller
oblasts thus have more measurement error. Second, the Western oblasts that were directly a⁄ected by the
German invastion and had a relatively large fraction of Jews tended to be considerably larger than many of the
sparsely populated Eastern oblasts.
26coe¢ cient and the standard error on the measure of the impact of the Holocaust.
Panel A shows a negative correlation between our ex ante impact of the Holocaust variable,
Pex ante
i , and the size of the middle class in 1989. This correlation is statistically signi￿cant
only at 10% in the unweighted speci￿cation of column 1, but is highly signi￿cant in column 2
when we use the weighted speci￿cation.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the speci￿cations in columns 1 and 2 except that they use a










where Ni is the Nazi occupation dummy oblast i, MC
39;i is the total number working in the core
middle class professions in 1939 and JMC
39;i is the number of Jews in core middle class profes-
sions.46 Recall that we could not construct such a variable at the city level because we only
have access to the detailed occupational structure data at the oblast level. All speci￿cations
in which we use P
M;ex ante
i also include the main e⁄ect of the percentage of the 1939 middle
class that was Jewish as an additional control. The coe¢ cient estimate in column 3 is -0.048
(s.e.=0.016), which implies that an oblast in which Jews constituted 1% of the (core) middle
class in 1939 has 4.8% smaller (census) middle class in 1989; and a one standard deviation
rise in the percentage of 1939 middle class that was Jewish among occupied oblasts (2.33) is
associated with an 11% decrease in the size of the middle class in 1989. This is, once again,
a sizable e⁄ect, and seems to re￿ ect more than the direct in￿ uence of the Holocaust on the
middle class. The magnitude of the e⁄ect may be related to the fact that the disappearance
of the largely Jewish middle class in certain oblasts may have changed the overall economic
and social development of the area and led to an occupational structure that has many fewer
middle class occupations today. The speci￿cation in column 4 uses population weights and
returns an almost identical coe¢ cient of -0.050, which is signi￿cant at the 1% level. Column
5 includes the percent Jewish population in 1989 to check whether part of the e⁄ect could be
related to the contemporaneous impact of (or the lack of) Jewish presence in the oblast. The
inclusion of this variable does not change the relationship between P
M;ex ante
i and the current
social structure of the oblast. The coe¢ cient on the variable itself is 0.105 (s.e.=0.139) and
46The results are very similar if we use the same de￿nition of middle class as in the censuses after 1939 rather
than our ￿core￿ middle class measure. For example, the estimates in column 7 would be -0.254 (s.e.=0.107)
in Panel A, -0.322 (s.e.=0.119) in Panel B, and -0.440 (s.e.=0.104) in Panel C. Since we have access to the
detailed occupation and industry data, we choose to exploit this information to focus on what appears to be
most relevant for our ￿social structure￿hypothesis.
27highly insigni￿cant.47
The speci￿cations in columns 6-9 are similar, except that they use an ex post measure of
the impact of the Holocaust on the size of middle class. This measure is de￿ned as
P
M, ex post















It proxies for the ex post change in the size of the middle class which is attributable to the
change in Jewish population between 1939 and 1959. The ￿rst term in P
M, ex post
i is the fraction
of the population that is middle class in 1939, the second term is the estimated fraction of
population that is middle class after the change in Jewish population, where ￿39;59Ji is the
estimated change in the total number of Jews in the oblast between 1939 and 1959 which is
attributable to the Holocaust. Note that this measure identi￿es the impact of the Holocaust
using both the loss of Jewish population in the occupied oblasts and the (slight) rise in Jewish
population in oblasts behind the front lines (see Appendix Table 6).
The coe¢ cient in column 6, with an identical set of covariates to columns 1 and 2, is
￿0:499 (s.e.=0.282), which is statistically signi￿cant only at 10%. Nevertheless, the population
weighted speci￿cation in column 7 yields a very similar coe¢ cient, which is now statistically
signi￿cant at 5%. The magnitude of the latter coe¢ cient implies that a one standard deviation
rise in the ex post impact on the middle class (0.084) is associated with a 5.0% lower middle
class in 1989. Columns 8 and 9 show additional robustness checks. Column 8 again includes
the control for the proportion of the population of an oblast that was Jewish in 1989. The
coe¢ cient almost doubles to -0.984 (s.e.=0.292) and is statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level.
Column 9 includes the ex post change in total population, both by itself and also interacted
with the German occupation dummy, as in Table 4. These variables should capture any
heterogeneities in the direct e⁄ect of the destruction and loss of life caused by the war. They
are themselves not statistically signi￿cant (not reported), though they reduce the statistical
signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient of P
M, ex post
i slightly.
Panels B and C report similar results to those in Panel A, but for the middle class variable
in 1979 and in 1970. The general picture is similar to that in Panel A, though many of the
estimates using the ex post measure P
M, ex post
i as well as those that control for the direct
47Though this coe¢ cient at ￿rst looks sizable and comparable in magnitude to the coe¢ cient estimate of
P
M, ex ante
j , this reading would not be accurate. In 1989 there are very few Jews living in Russia, just 0.146% of
the population in the previously occupied oblasts (with a standard deviation of 0.158). A one standard deviation
rise in the percentage of Jewish population in 1989 is thus associated with a 1.7% increase in size of the middle
class in 1989, whereas a one standard deviation rise in the percentage of the middle class constituted by Jews
in 1939 (2.326) is associated with an 11.7% drop in the size of the middle class in 1989.
28e⁄ect of the war are now more precisely estimated.
Finally, we also performed two falsi￿cation exercises, similar to those for cities in Table 3,
except that we can now use information on percent Jewish population in the oblast in 1926
(which we do not have available for cities). We have data for 31 of our 48 oblasts; and the same
results in Panels A-C go through with this subsample. In a speci￿cation identical to column 1
(i.e., with the same set of covariates and without population weights), the coe¢ cient estimate
is 0.204 (s.e.= 0.334). Instead, when we use population weights, the coe¢ cient is 0.109 (s.e.=
0.267). The results show no evidence of statistically signi￿cant pre-trends at the oblast level.48
Both diagrammatic analysis of outliers and more formal tests did not show any evidence
that outliers are responsible for these results. For example, the robust regression estimate
(again using the procedure described above) corresponding to the baseline speci￿cation in col-
umn 6 is -0.577 (s.e.=0.190) in Panel A, -0.854 (s.e.=0.273) in Panel B, and -0.876 (s.e.=0.205)
in Panel C.
5.3 Holocaust and Education
Another potential channel for the impact of the Holocaust might be through a persistent e⁄ect
on educational attainment. Our oblast-level data enable us to investigate this possibility. The
results are shown in Appendix Table 3, using the log of the total number of individuals that
graduated from university; and we also looked at the fraction of the population with various
years of schooling. Though we could tell a similar story in which the Holocaust had a persistent
e⁄ect on the political and economic equilibrium in Russian oblasts, because it targeted a
stratum of highly educated individuals, the results are generally weaker for education than
those reported for the size of the middle class.49
5.4 Political and Economic Outcomes
We next examine the relationship between the Holocaust and political and economic outcomes
at the oblast level. The results are reported in Table 7. In Panel A of Table 7 the dependent
variable is the percentage of votes in favor of the preservation of the Soviet Union in the 1991
48We do not perform falsi￿cation exercises with the other measures since these would be mechanically corre-
lated with log middle class in 1939. For example, in columns 3-5, we would have the size of the middle class on
the left hand side and the size of the Jewish middle class, a signi￿cant proportion of the overall middle class,
on the right hand side. In columns 6-9, we would have the size of the middle class in 1939 on the left hand
side and an estimate of the change in the size of the middle class between 1926 and 1939 on the right hand side
(we do not have this problem in the other panels, since we are using 1959 numbers in constructing the ex post
change, while using outcome variables for 1970, 1979 and 1989).
49A reason for this might be the large expansion in educational attainment in Russia in the pre and post-war
years, which may attenuate the impact of the Holocaust on these variables.
29referendum. The structure of the table and the set of covariates are the same as in Table 6,
except that total population in the current year is no longer included on the right hand side
since the dependent variables are given in percentages or on a per capita basis.
The estimated coe¢ cients in Panel A are positive and statistically signi￿cant in all columns
except column 1. The pattern suggests that the oblasts that experienced the Holocaust more
severely were politically more opposed to reform in 1991. For example, the coe¢ cient in
column 7 (0.649, s.e.=0.179) implies that a one standard deviation rise in the ex post impact
on the middle class (0.084) is associated with a 5.5% rise in the vote share in favor of preserving
the Soviet Union. Consistent with the hypothesis that the channel of in￿ uence may be through
social structure, the estimates are much more precise in columns 6-9, when we use P
M; ex post
i .
Columns 5, 8 and 9 also show that the results are robust to controlling for percent Jewish
population in 1989 and for our proxies of the direct e⁄ects of the destruction and loss of
life in World War II. When we control for the latter, the coe¢ cient drops signi￿cantly, but
remains marginally signi￿cant. The fact that the estimated e⁄ect of the Holocaust is somewhat
attenuated in this speci￿cation is not entirely surprising as the loss of life during World War
II may of course be itself endogenous to the Holocaust.
Figure 6 shows the conditional relationship between P
M, ex post
i and the 1991 referendum
vote visually (the ￿gure corresponds to the speci￿cation in column 7). The robust regression
coe¢ cient (again see above) corresponding to this speci￿cation is 0.483 (s.e.=0.179).
Panel B of Table 9 examines the vote share of communist candidates in the Duma elections
of 1999, the variable used in our city-level analysis. The overall pattern is very similar to that
in Panel A, though the e⁄ects tend to be less precisely estimated and, except for those in
columns 5-8, statistically insigni￿cant.
Panels C and D report the relationship between the potential impact of the Holocaust
and our two economic outcome variables, average wage and GDP per capita at the oblast
level. Panel C shows a negative association between the various measures of the severity of
the Holocaust and log average wages in 2002. This association is statistically signi￿cant at 5%
in all columns, except column 1. The quantitative e⁄ects implied by the estimates in Panel
A are large. For example, the estimate in column 7 (-1.075, s.e.=0.218) suggests that a one
standard deviation rise in the ex post impact on the middle class is associated with a 9.0% fall
in average wages in 2002.
Panel D of Table 7 reports similar results using log GDP per capita in 2002. The overall
pattern is similar, where again all coe¢ cients except the one in column 1 tend to be statistically
signi￿cant.
306 Robustness Checks and Further Results
We performed a number of other robustness checks. The relevant tables for these results are
presented in the Appendix. Appendix Table 4 shows that our results are similar if we use data
from the 1937 census instead of the 1939 census.
Appendix Table 5 repeats some of the speci￿cations from Tables 2-4 for Ukrainian cities.
One di¢ culty in this case is that, as discussed in Section 2, there was much greater het-
erogeneity in the German administration of Ukraine during World War II. For example, the
persecution of Jews was, according to the historical literature, much more severe in parts of
the Ukraine which were under the control of the SS, than in the areas administered by the
Romanian government (Dallin, 1981, Ofer 1993). Nevertheless, there is still a negative rela-
tionship between the ex ante measure of the impact of the Holocaust, Pex ante
i , and growth of
city population.
Throughout the paper we focused on the e⁄ect of the persecution and displacement of
Jews during the Holocaust on the long- run economic and political development of the a⁄ected
societies. We have intentionally refrained from making any claims regarding the number of Jews
that were murdered in any particular area, both because this is a contentious issue to which
we have nothing to add and the exact numbers are not central to our argument. Nevertheless,
we can use historical sources on the number of individuals murdered both to get some idea
about how the severity of the Holocaust varied across areas and as an alternative validation
of the source of variation we are exploiting. In particular, we coded detailed reports sent to
Berlin by the four Einsatzgruppen that moved into the areas occupied by the Wehrmacht.50
The reports include passages such as: ￿The Jews set ￿re to the town center of Tschernigow
before the arrival of the German troops. A commando of security police and SD therefore shot
all remaining Jews. A few days later 49 returning Jews were captured and shot. (p. 257)￿ .
Altogether, the Einsatzgruppen report 216 incidents. For 175 of these incidents the reports
give a speci￿c number of victims, totalling 156,401. Of these, 86% are reported to be Jews
(which by all accounts is a small subset of the total number of Jewish victims of the German
occupation). We matched the town names given in the Einsatzgruppen reports to an extended
sample of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian cities for which we have information on the
number of Jews in 1939. In total, we are able to identify 44 towns, 10 of which are in Russia, the
remainder in Ukraine and Belarus. Figure 7 gives a scatterplot of the number of Jews reportedly
killed as a percentage of the 1939 population over the percentage of Jewish population in 1939.
50We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this source.
31The regression line given shows a weak positive relationship between the two variables 0.109
(s.e.=0.070). For the subset of 10 Russian observations the association is much stronger with
a coe¢ cient of 0.194 (s.e.=0.038). For the subset of Ukrainian observations the relationship
is weakest with a coe¢ cient of 0.050 (s.e.=0.068), which gives some support to our conjecture
that the severity of the Holocaust was much more uniform in Russia than in the Ukraine.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we documented a statistical association between the severity of the Holocaust and
long-run economic and political outcomes within Russia. Cities that experienced the Holocaust
most intensely have grown less and administrative districts (oblasts) where the Holocaust had
the largest impact have lower GDP per capita and lower average wages today. In addition,
these same cities and oblasts exhibit a higher vote share for communist candidates since the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
Although we cannot rule out the possibility that these statistical relationships are caused
by other factors, the overall patterns appear to be robust to several plausible variations. We
conjecture that the Holocaust￿ s impact on social structure, in particular on the size of the
middle class, across di⁄erent regions of Russia may be partly responsible for its persistent
e⁄ects. Before World War II, Russian Jews were predominantly in white collar (middle class)
occupations and the Holocaust appears to have had a direct negative e⁄ect on the size of the
middle class after the war.
Overall, the pattern of historical correlations presented here is consistent with possible
adverse long-run economic and political e⁄ects of major shocks to the social structure. Nev-
ertheless, we have also emphasized that considerable caution is necessary in interpreting these
results. It is possible that Russian cities and regions with large fractions of Jewish populations
were systematically di⁄erent from others, and that these di⁄erences translated into di⁄erential
paths of economic and political development. In addition, the magnitude of some of the e⁄ects
we report are large and can only be rationalized if the Holocaust unleashed a process of diver-
gent economic, political and social development. Finally, Russian society has su⁄ered various
other shocks and hardships during the past 90 years and these experiences may be confounding
our empirical analysis of the implications of the Holocaust (though controlling for proxies for
some of these shocks does not a⁄ect our results).
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40Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cities Oblasts
total occupied occ. & high total occupied occ. & high
Jewish Pop Jewish Pop
City Population 1939 55811 42099 49303
(80548) (52147) (61952)
Percent Urbanization 1939 32.34 22.69 26.31
(16.80) (10.15) (10.62)
Percent Middle Class 1939 19.24 15.33 16.07
(7.30) (5.83) (5.41)
Percent Jewish Pop. 1939 0.88 2.01 4.01 0.55 0.65 0.89
(2.61) (3.94) (4.83) (0.42) (0.37) (0.33)
Percent Middle Class 1959 20.83 17.48 18.15
(5.15) (3.82) (3.18)
Percent Middle Class 1989 30.97 28.47 28.80
(4.20) (2.49) (1.82)
City Population 1989 153002 112693 125386
(243417) (147677) (173047)
Percent Urbanization 1989 70.92 66.46 67.41
(10.74) (6.41) (3.14)
GDP per Capita 2002 5854.67 4554.80 4659.15
(2904.60) (1060.67) (1201.43)
Average Wage 2002 447.80 411.43 388.40 466.78 360.16 361.17
(111.68) (100.16) (48.95) (217.95) (75.94) (71.44)
1991 Referendum 73.81 77.84 76.74
(7.57) (4.25) (4.86)
Percent Communist Vote (1999 Duma) 27.99 32.82 33.49 26.62 29.42 31.50
(7.18) (6.63) (7.99) (7.83) (9.18) (10.39)
Establishments Defense Industry 1939 5.25 3.25 4.32 27.35 16.55 16.50
(10.14) (6.47) (8.61) (36.61) (17.47) (12.16)
Establishments Defense Industry 1945 7.75 3.61 4.66 41.40 17.82 16.67
(16.97) (6.92) (9.09) (58.20) (17.54) (10.98)
Establishments Defense Industry 1989 15.47 10.78 14.29 79.44 58.09 60.50
(32.86) (19.77) (24.62) (88.03) (38.28) (22.19)
N 278 76 38 44 11 6
Note: Values are averages across Russian cities and oblasts with standard deviations in parentheses. Column 1 refers
to the sample of Russian cities as used in Table 2 (Note that the number of observations for Average Wage 2002 and
Percent Communist Vote 1999 are only 88 and 74 respectively). Column 2 refers to the sample as in Table 3 Panel B,
the subset of Russian cities which were occupied by German forces or their allies during World War II (Note that the
number of observations for Average Wage 2002 and Percent Communist Vote 1999 are only 23 and 18 respectively).
Column 4 refers to the sample of Russian oblasts as used in Table 6. Column 5 refers to the subset of oblasts that
were wholly or to a large part occupied during World War II. Columns 3 and 6 refer to the subset of occupied Russian
cities and oblasts which had a higher than the median percentage of Jewish population in 1939, respectively. All
1939 observations are transformed to match contemporary oblast boundaries using a weighing matrix constructed
from highly disaggregated 1939 population data. Unless otherwise indicated all data are coded from the o±cial USSR
censuses of 1939, 1959 and 1989. City Population refers to the total number of residents in urban settlements for
which data are available and Percent Urbanization refers to the percentage of oblast population dwelling in urban
areas. Percent Middle Class is the percentage of oblast population that was classi¯ed as \white collar" according to
the de¯nition in the census years following 1939. GDP per Capita 2002 is the oblast-level \gross regional product"
taken from contemporary o±cial Russian statistics and converted to 2002 PPP equivalent dollars according to the
Worldbank/ICP conversion factors. 1991 Referendum refers to the percentage votes in favor of preserving the Soviet
Union in the 1991 all-union referendum. Percent Communist Vote 1999 refers to the percentage of votes cast in favor
of communist parties in the 1999 Duma elections. Establishments Defense Industry is the number of factories, research
and design establishments of the Soviet defense industry operated in the city/oblast in the year given, according to

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Growth of Russian Cities Since 1926
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log City Population
Year 1939 1959 1970 1989 1989
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Panel A All Russian Cities
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.018 -0.038 -0.050 -0.068 -0.067
(0.040) (0.016) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028)
German Occupation Dummy -0.199 0.045 0.071 0.151 0.143
(0.098) (0.080) (0.094) (0.113) (0.116)
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 0.024 0.010 0.013 0.022 0.023
(0.038) (0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025)
Log City Pop. '26 0.787
(0.040)
Log City Pop. '39 0.964 0.957 0.960 0.941
(0.021) (0.026) (0.031) (0.040)
N 278 278 278 278 278
Panel B Occupied Russian Cities
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation 0.013 -0.007 -0.017 -0.025 -0.026
(0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
Log City Pop. '26 0.777
(0.078)
Log City Pop. '39 0.940 0.922 0.910 0.937
(0.057) (0.062) (0.072) (0.071)
N 76 76 76 76 76
Defense Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes
District F.E. yes yes yes yes yes
Note: Columns 1-4 report ordinary least squares regressions. Column 5 reports in-
strumental variables regressions, instrumenting log city population 1939 with log city
population 1926. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Dependent variable
is log city population in the indicated year. Speci¯cations in all columns contain dis-
trict ¯xed e®ects, geographic controls (Degrees Longitude and Degrees Latitude), as
well as controls for growth in the defense industry (Growth Defense Industry '39-'59
and Relocated Defense Industry '39-'59). Speci¯cations in Panel A use the full sample
of Russian cities; speci¯cations in Panel B use the subset of cities which were occupied
during World War II. Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation is the interaction between
the percentage of the 1939 city population that was Jewish with a ¯xed e®ect for cities
which were occupied during World War II (German Occupation Dummy). See Data
Appendix for details.
43Table 4
Electoral and Economic Outcomes in Russian Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A Log % Communist Vote 1999
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation 0.110 0.122 0.158 0.084 0.110 0.123 0.044 0.054
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.034) (0.013) (0.021)
German Occupation Dummy 0.073 0.044 -0.078 0.115 0.109 0.043
(0.097) (0.100) (0.078) (0.122) (0.113) (0.101)
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 -0.083 -0.089 -0.113 -0.058 -0.082 -0.089
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.020)
Ex-post Pop. Change x Occupation 0.158
(0.144)
Ex-post Pop. Change 0.104
(0.099)
N 74 74 74 74 74 73 18 17
Panel B Log Average Wage 2002
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.029 -0.042 -0.023 -0.044 -0.048 -0.062 -0.034 -0.056
(0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029)
German Occupation Dummy -0.013 0.017 0.100 0.077 0.133 0.032
(0.073) (0.077) (0.067) (0.081) (0.143) (0.081)
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 -0.004 0.007 0.007 0.022 0.010 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013)
Ex-post Pop. Change x Occupation 0.192
(0.256)
Ex-post Pop. Change -0.164
(0.099)
N 88 88 88 88 88 87 23 22
Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District F.E. yes yes no yes yes yes no no
Defense Industry Controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Population Weights no no no yes no no no no
Smolensk Excluded no no no no no yes no yes
Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. All speci¯cations contain controls
for growth in the defense industry (Growth Defense Industry '39-'59 and Relocated Defense Industry '39-'59) and a
constant term. Speci¯cations in all columns except column 1 contain geographical controls (degrees longitude and
latitude); and all speci¯cations except columns 3, 7 and 8 contain district ¯xed e®ects. The regressions reported in
column 4 are weighted with population in 1939. All other columns report unweighted regressions. Columns 1-5 report
regressions using the full sample of Russian cities. Column 6 excludes Smolensk; column 7 reports regressions using
only cities which were occupied during World War II and the speci¯cation in column 8 furthermore excludes Smolensk
from this restricted sample. Dependent variable in Panel A is the log of the percentage of votes received by communist
candidates in the 1999 Duma elections. Dependent variable in Panel B is the log of the average wage in 2002. Percent
Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation is the interaction between the percentage of the 1939 city population that was Jewish
with a ¯xed e®ect for cities which were occupied during World War II. Ex-post Pop. Change x Occupation is the
negative of population growth between 1939 and 1959 interacted with the German Occupation Dummy. See Data
Appendix for details.
44Table 5
Jews as a percentage of total Workforce by Social Group and Sector, 1939
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Social Group / Sector Trade Education Health Government Industry Agriculture Other Total
Panel A Occupied Oblasts with Percent Jewish Population 1939 ¸ Median
Liberal Professions 0 6.2 68.2 12.9 0 0 0 11.2
Handicraftsmen 26.7 14.5 0 14.4 6.8 .1 16.5 7.4
White Collar Workers 9.9 4.1 10 4.2 4.4 2.2 4 5.3
Blue Collar Workers 1.6 .9 .8 1.1 1.2 .3 1.1 1.1
Farmers, Kolkhoz Members .2 .1 0 .1 0 0 .7 .1
Total economically active 5.3 2.8 5.2 3 2.1 .1 2 1
Panel B Occupied Oblasts
Liberal Professions 0 3.6 41.7 9 0 0 0 6.8
Handicraftsmen 16.8 8.1 .8 13.6 3.3 .1 8.4 3.7
White Collar Workers 5.6 2.7 6.8 2.6 2.9 1.4 2.7 3.3
Blue Collar Workers .8 .5 .4 .6 .6 .2 .9 .6
Farmers, Kolkhoz Members .1 0 0 0 0 0 .7 0
Total economically active 3 1.8 3.3 1.8 1.2 .1 1.4 .7
Panel C All Oblasts
Liberal Professions 0 2.7 26.8 5.8 0 0 .3 4.5
Handicraftsmen 6.9 2.8 .7 4.5 1.5 .1 4.8 1.6
White Collar Workers 3 2.1 4.5 1.8 2 .9 2.5 2.2
Blue Collar Workers .4 .4 .3 .4 .4 .2 .7 .4
Farmers, Kolkhoz Members 0 0 .2 .1 0 0 .6 0
Total economically active 1.6 1.4 2.3 1.3 .7 .1 1.2 .6
Note: This table gives the average percentage of the workforce in Russian oblasts by industry and social group that
was constituted by Jews in 1939. Panel A refers to the subset of oblasts which were occupied during World War II
and had a higher than the median percentage of Jewish population in 1939. Panel B refers to all oblasts which were
occupied during World War II; and Panel C refers to all Russian oblasts in our sample. The classi¯cations of industry
and social groups are taken directly from the 1939 Soviet Census. Columns 1-7 refer to individuals working in (1)
trade; (2) education, science, art and print; (3) health care; (4) government; (5) industry, building and transport; (6)
forestry and agriculture; and (7) housing and other industries; respectively. Column 8 gives the total percentage of
each social group that was constituted by Jews in 1939. Liberal Professions refers to \Persons in the liberal professions,
including those engaged in some form of intellectual activity, such as writers or physicians, who are not on the sta® of
any institution or enterprise". See Appendix Table 2 for the relative size of the total workforce in each industry and
social group.
45Table 6
Impact of the Holocaust on Size of the Middle Class in Russian Oblasts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A Log Middle Class 1989
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.137 -0.224
(0.072) (0.063)
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. -0.048 -0.050 -0.053
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class -0.499 -0.590 -0.984 -0.611
(0.282) (0.227) (0.292) (0.273)
Panel B Log Middle Class 1979
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.139 -0.242
(0.101) (0.075)
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. -0.052 -0.054 -0.057
(0.022) (0.015) (0.015)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class -0.669 -0.733 -1.165 -0.709
(0.354) (0.244) (0.316) (0.310)
Panel C Log Middle Class 1970
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.065 -0.185
(0.132) (0.092)
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. -0.041 -0.046 -0.050
(0.024) (0.016) (0.017)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class -0.979 -0.957 -1.393 -0.765
(0.307) (0.213) (0.296) (0.272)
N 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 47
Pop. weights no yes no yes yes no yes yes yes
Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 2, 4, 5, and 7-9 report regressions
weighted with population in 1939, all other columns report unweighted regressions. All speci¯cations contain a constant term,
the German Occupation Dummy, Percent Jewish Pop. '39, Log Middle Class 1939, log total population in the indicated year,
as well as controls for log urban population 1939, the longitude and latitude of the oblast capital, controls for growth in the
defense industry (Growth Defense Industry '39-'59 and Relocated Defense Industry '39-'59) and for output of oil and gas 2002.
The speci¯cations in columns 3-5 also include Percent Middle Class Jews '39 as a control. The speci¯cations in columns 5 and 8
add the percentage of oblast population that was Jewish in 1989; and column 9 reports speci¯cations including the negative of
population growth between 1939 and 1959 and the interaction of this variable with the German Occupation Dummy. Dependent
variable in all panels is log of middle class population in the indicated year. Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation is the interaction
between the percentage of the 1939 oblast population that was Jewish with a ¯xed e®ect for oblasts which were occupied during
World War II (German Occupation Dummy). Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. is the interaction between the percentage of
the 1939 middle class that was Jewish and the German Occupation Dummy. Ex-post Impact on Middle Class is the percentage
point change of the percentage middle class which is attributable to the change in Jewish population between 1939 and 1959.
See Data Appendix for details.
46Table 7
Impact of the Holocaust on Electoral and Economic Outcomes in Russian Oblasts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A 1991 Referendum
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation 0.088 0.140
(0.055) (0.039)
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. 0.021 0.026 0.028
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class 0.584 0.649 0.698 0.389
(0.194) (0.179) (0.199) (0.203)
Panel B 1999 Duma
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation 0.112 0.220
(0.186) (0.136)
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. 0.023 0.037 0.039
(0.027) (0.022) (0.021)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class 1.156 1.108 1.352 0.238
(0.534) (0.563) (0.555) (0.849)
Panel C Log Average Wage 2002
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.203 -0.380
(0.163) (0.099)
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. -0.083 -0.079 -0.081
(0.030) (0.017) (0.016)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class -0.816 -1.075 -1.473 -0.718
(0.370) (0.218) (0.280) (0.296)
Panel D Log GDP p.c. 2002
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.289 -0.496
(0.194) (0.120)
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. -0.096 -0.091 -0.096
(0.052) (0.032) (0.033)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class -1.065 -1.528 -1.724 -1.326
(0.543) (0.378) (0.551) (0.495)
N 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 47
Pop. weights no yes no yes yes no yes yes yes
Note: Ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 2, 4, 5 and 6-9 report regressions
weighted with population in 1939, all other columns report unweighted regressions. All speci¯cations contain a constant term,
the German Occupation Dummy, Percent Jewish Pop. '39, Log Middle Class 1939, as well as controls for log urban population
1939, the longitude and latitude of the oblast capital, controls for growth in the defense industry (Growth Defense Industry
'39-'59 and Relocated Defense Industry '39-'59) and for output of oil and gas 2002. The speci¯cations in columns 3-5 also include
Percent Middle Class Jews '39 as a control. The speci¯cations in columns 5 and 8 add the percentage of oblast population that
was Jewish in 1989; and column 9 reports speci¯cations including the negative of population growth between 1939 and 1959 and
the interaction of this variable with the German Occupation Dummy. Panel A: Dependent variable is log percentage of votes in
favor of preserving the Soviet Union in 1991; Panel B: Dependent variable is log percentage votes for the communist candidates
in the 1999 Duma elections. Panel C: Dependent variable is log average wage in 2002. Panel D: Dependent variable is log GDP
per capita in 2002. Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation is the interaction between the percentage of the 1939 oblast population
that was Jewish with a ¯xed e®ect for oblasts which were occupied during World War II (German Occupation Dummy). Percent
Middle Class Jews '39 x Occ. is the interaction between the percentage of the 1939 middle class that was Jewish and the German























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Changes in Administrative Boundaries
One key issue that we faced in putting together the data we use in this paper was changes in
the administrative boundaries. Between 1939 and 1959 all three tiers of local administration,
krais (primary), oblasts (secondary) and raions (tertiary), changed and shifted dramatically.
In addition, territories were frequently re-named and re-classi￿ed into di⁄erent sub-categories
(autonomous okrugs, autonomous oblasts, republics, etc.). Therefore, it is impossible to match
observations over time by name or location alone. Since we are interested in data at the
oblast level, the most obvious way of dealing with the problem is to identify which raions
shifted from one oblast to another. Unfortunately, the number, shape and names of these
local entities (there are over 2000) have changed even more drastically than the other levels of
administration, so that identi￿cation is impossible on that basis. In order to obtain reliable
weights for transforming 1939-entities into their present-day equivalents, we worked at the
level of local communities (towns, townlets and villages). In the 1939 census, the names of the
major village or town are listed for each raion. Since local communities were a lot less likely
to be re-named, it was possible to identify the present-day oblast they are located in by using
geographical gazetteers. By identifying them with their main dwellings, it was subsequently
possible to determine in which oblast the 1939 raions are located today. For oblasts that
changed shape, all village and town names had to be checked individually. In a country the
size of the former Soviet Union there are, of course, many entities that share the same name.
Nevertheless it was possible to identify almost all of these entities by eliminating those towns
and villages with the same name that were geographically distant from the oblast studied. In
the few cases in which we could not precisely determine whether or not the 1939 raion had
shifted, we assumed that its population shifted to other oblasts in the same proportion as the
average of the other raions in the oblast for which we have data. Since the 1939 census lists
urban and rural population numbers for each raion, we were then able to construct present-day
equivalent administrative units as weighted averages of the 1939 observations. Since many of
the variables we are interested in vary greatly between urban and rural regions, we distinguish
between the two when constructing the weights.
55Appendix Table 1
Data Description and Sources
Variable Description Source
1991 Referendum Percentage of voters who voted `yes' to the question \Do you con-
sider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of
equal sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedoms
of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?" in the 1991 USSR
referendum.
Centre for Russian Stud-








Percentage of votes received by the two communist parties (KPRF
and KTRSS) in the 1999 Duma elections. This is the only elec-
tion for which constituency-level results are available. In the city-
level dataset we use only constituencies which could be uniquely














The number of defense factories, research, and design establish-
ments operating in a given oblast or city in the year indicated.
This number is constructed by matching 21,353 establishments
listed in the Dexter and Rodionov (2009) database to the names
of Russian cities, towns, and villages as given in the 1989 USSR
census. We primarily matched to the names of cities in 1996 but
also used information on the former names, speci¯cally in 1989 and
1939. Multiple matches were resolved by using the name of the
oblast in which the defense establishment was located. We then
attempted to identify un-matched locations by running through
several permutations of the British Standard and the (US) Library
of Congress transliterations of the Cyrillic alphabet. Altogether
we were able to determine the present-day location of 17,914 es-
tablishments, which operated in the USSR between 1917 and 1989;
and 15,215 of which are in present-day Russia. We then used the
information on the years in which the establishment was operating
to count the number of operating establishments in 1939, 1945,
1959, and 1989 in each city and oblast. The series Relocated De-
fense Industry was generated in the same manner, except that
we restricted the count to establishments which are reported in
the database to have relocated from one location to another at
some point in their history. The variable Growth Defense Indus-
try is de¯ned as Gi =
Ci(1959)¡Ci(1939)
Ci(1959) ; where we set Gi = 0 if
Ci(1959) = Ci(1939) = 0 and Ci(t) is the count of Establishments
Defense Industry in oblast or city i and year t. In the city level
dataset there are 8 cities for which Ci(1959) = 0 and Ci(1939) > 0.
For these observations we set Gi = ¡1: The variable Relocated
Defense Industry is de¯ned analogously where Ci(t) is the count
of Relocated Defense Industry in oblast or city i and year t; and
there are 5 cities for which Ci(1959) = 0 and Ci(1939) > 0.
Dexter and Rodionov (2009);





Log of average wage in 2002 converted to PPP USD (according to
Worldbank ICP at 9.2 Rubles per Dollar).
Regioni Rusii (2003); East-
View Universal Database
Log City Popula-
tion '26, '39, '70,
'89 (City-level)
Log of city/town population. 1939 values for cities/towns that
have non-zero Jewish population are imputed from Altshuler
(1993).
1926 USSR Census, Volumes
1-8, Tables 10; 1939 USSR
Census, Volume 1, Table
2; Altshuler (1993a); 1970




Log of the \gross regional product" per capita in 2002 converted
to PPP USD (according to Worldbank ICP at 9.2 Rubles per
Dollar).
Regioni Rusii (2004);
Continued on next page




Log of the population classi¯ed as \white collar workers"
(sluzhashchieye) in the 1926 census (see entry for Log Middle class
'89-'59 for a de¯nition). The remaining categories are \workers"
(rabochie) and a residual category including individuals working
in the agricultural sector. Note that a weighing-scheme described
in the data appendix is used to adjust for changes in administra-
tive boundaries since 1926. Where available, this data was coded
at the ujezd level (326 observations for Russia). The variable is
constructed by taking the percentage white collar workers given in
the census, multiplying it with total oblast population and taking
the logarithm.
1926 USSR Census, Volume




Log of the population classi¯ed as either \white collar workers"
(sluzhashchieye), \artisans in cooperatives" (kooperirovannye kus-
tari), \artisans not in cooperatives" (nekooperirovannye kustari)
or \individuals of liberal professions" (ludi, svobodnyh professiy).
The remaining categories are \members of collective farms - white
collar workers" (chleny kolhoza - sluzhashie), "members of col-
lective farms - workers" (chleny kolhoza - rabochie), "collective
farmers" (kolhozniki), \private farmers" (krestiyane edinolich-
niki), and \workers" (rabochie). The original census documents
used to code this data do not explicitly remark the inclusion of
the autonomous oblasts in the numbers of the oblasts and krais of
which they are subdivisions. Basic consistency checks suggest that
the numbers for all autonomous oblasts except Adygeskaya are in-
cluded in the numbers of their parent entity. Appropriate adjust-
ments have been made to the data. Note that a weighing-scheme
described in the data appendix is used to adjust for changes in
administrative boundaries since 1939. The variable is constructed
by taking the percentage of the economically active population
which fall in the categories listed above, multiplying it with total
oblast population and taking the logarithm.
1939 USSR Census, Forms
13;
Log Middle Class
'59, '70, '79, '89
Log of population classi¯ed as \white collar workers" (sluzhashchi-
eye) in the USSR censi. Sluzhashchieye are classi¯ed as \Individ-
uals who are predominantly occupied in mental labour, working in
government, cooperated and public institutions, enterprises, insti-
tutions and establishments. Individuals working in free (svobod-
nykh) professions (writers, artists, doctors, etc.) who are not on
sta® at a speci¯c institution or organisation." (Maksimov, 1976,
p. 211) The remaining categories are \Workers" (rabochie) and
\Farmers" (kolkhozniki). In 1989 and 1959 the censi tables iden-
tify a fourth, residual category of either unclassi¯ed or unclas-
si¯able individuals. Although this latter category may include
(among others) non-collectivized farmers and free artisans we do
not add it to our de¯nition of \middle class" as it appears only
in two of the six censi and accounts for only about 0.1% of the
population. The variable is constructed by taking the percentage
white collar workers given in the census, multiplying it with total
oblast population and taking the logarithm.
1959 USSR Census, Table 29;
1979 USSR Census, Table




Log of the population that graduated from an educational institu-
tion with degree-level facilities (vyssheye): universities, institutes
(specialized technical colleges), or military academies.
1979 USSR Census, Table




An oblast is classi¯ed as occupied if the average urban citizen in
our city-level dataset lived under the occupation for at least 6
months. A city is classi¯ed as occupied if it is listed in the o±cial
list of occupied cities on soldat.ru. Cities that were only partially




Continued on next page
1Our results are robust to various ways of computing this variable.
57Appendix Table 1 { continued from previous page
Variable Description Source
Output of Oil and
Gas '02
Output of Oil and gas condensate in 1000 tons 2002 Regioni Rusii (2002);
Percent Jewish
Pop. '26, '39, '89
Jewish population as a percentage of total population. Note that
the number of Jews in 1939 is imputed from the number of eco-
nomically active Jews divided by the labor force participation
rate, where we assume that Jews and non-Jews had the same la-
bor force participation rate. The original 1939 census documents
used to code this data do not explicitly remark the inclusion of
the autonomous oblasts in the numbers of the oblasts and krais
of which they are subdivisions. Basic consistency checks suggest
that the numbers for all autonomous oblasts except Adygeskaya
are included in the numbers of their parent entity. Note that a
weighing-scheme described in the data appendix is used to ad-
just for changes in administrative boundaries since 1926 and 1939
respectively.
1926 USSR Census, Volumes




Jewish population as a percentage of total population according to
the 1937 census. The 1937 census gives data on Jewish population
for only 25 Russian oblasts. Missing observations in 1937 are
supplemented by the percent Jewish population in 1939.




Jewish population as a percentage of total city population in 1939. Altshuler (1993);
Percent Middle
Class Jews '39
Percentage of the economically active Jewish population work-
ing in the trade; education, science, art and print; and health
care sectors who were classi¯ed as either \white collar workers"
(sluzhashchieye), \artisans in cooperatives" (kooperirovannye kus-
tari), \artisans not in cooperatives" (nekooperirovannye kustari)
or \individuals of free professions" (ludi, svobodnyh professiy).
1939 USSR Census, Forms
13;
Log Urban Popula-
tion '26, '39, '59,
'70, '79, '89
Log of the population dwelling in urban areas. 1926 and 1939
values are percentage of economically active population dwelling
in urban areas. All other years are percentage of resident popula-
tion dwelling in urban areas. The original 1939 census documents
used to code this data do not explicitly remark the inclusion of
the autonomous oblasts in the numbers of the oblasts and krais
of which they are subdivisions. Basic consistency checks suggest
that the numbers for all autonomous oblasts except Adygeskaya
are included in the numbers of their parent entity. Note that a
weighing-scheme described in the data appendix is used to ad-
just for changes in administrative boundaries since 1926 and 1939
respectively.
1926 USSR census, Volume
26, Table 3; 1931 Polish Cen-
sus, VolumesXX, Tables 11;
1939 USSR Census, Forms
13; 1959 USSR Census, Ta-
ble 5; 1970 USSR Census, Ta-
ble 5; 1979 USSR Census, Ta-
ble 5; 1989 USSR Census CD-
ROM;
Population '39 Total population in 1939. Note that a weighing-scheme described
in the data appendix is used to adjust for changes in administra-
tive boundaries since 1939.
1939 USSR Census, Volume
1, Table 2;
58Appendix Table 2
Total Workforce by Social Group and Sector, 1939
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Social Group / Sector Trade Education Health Government Industry Agriculture Other Total
Occupied Oblasts with Percent Jewish Population 1939 ¸ Median
Liberal Professions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Handicraftsmen .1 0 0 0 2.1 0 .1 2.3
White Collar Workers 1.8 2.2 .7 1.6 3.9 .7 1 12
Blue Collar Workers 1.6 .7 .7 .4 13.8 2.6 1.9 21.8
Farmers, Kolkhoz Members .5 .5 .1 .4 2.2 59.2 1 64
Total economically active 4 3.5 1.5 2.5 22 62.5 4 100
Occupied Oblasts
Liberal Professions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Handicraftsmen .1 0 0 0 2.4 .2 .1 2.7
White Collar Workers 1.9 2.1 .8 1.9 3.9 1 1.1 12.6
Blue Collar Workers 1.7 .7 .8 .4 15 4 2.2 24.8
Farmers, Kolkhoz Members .6 .6 .1 .5 2.5 54.4 1.1 59.8
Total economically active 4.3 3.4 1.8 2.8 23.8 59.5 4.4 100
All Oblasts
Liberal Professions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Handicraftsmen 0 0 0 0 2.7 .2 .1 3
White Collar Workers 2.5 2.4 1 2.6 5.7 1.1 1.2 16.4
Blue Collar Workers 2.6 1 1 .6 21.5 4.6 2.7 34
Farmers, Kolkhoz Members .5 .5 .1 .4 1.9 41.9 1.1 46.5
Total economically active 5.6 3.8 2.1 3.7 31.9 47.8 5.2 100
Note: This table gives the average percentage of the 1939 workforce employed in each industry and social group. Panel
A refers to the subset of oblasts which were occupied during World War II and had a higher than the median percentage
of Jewish population in 1939. Panel B refers to all oblasts which were occupied during World War II; and Panel C
refers to all Russian oblasts in our sample. The classi¯cations of industry and social groups are taken directly from
the 1939 Soviet Census. Columns 1-7 refer to individuals working in (1) trade; (2) education, science, art and print;
(3) health care; (4) government; (5) industry, building and transport; (6) forestry and agriculture; and (7) housing
and other industries; respectively. Column 8 gives the total percentage of each social group that was constituted by
Jews in 1939. Liberal Professions refers to \Persons in the liberal professions, including those engaged in some form of








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Measuring the Impact of the Holocaust using Data from 1937 Census
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Log Middle Class 1989
Percent Jewish Pop. '37 x Occupation -0.134 -0.203
(0.065) (0.057)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class ('37 data) -0.602 -0.716 -1.057 -0.744
(0.279) (0.224) (0.294) (0.266)
N 48 48 47 47 47 47
Panel B Log Middle Class 1989
Percent Jewish Pop. '37 x Occupation -0.067 0.041
(0.159) (0.123)
Ex-post Impact on Middle Class ('37 data) -0.607 -0.435 -1.360 -0.371
(0.255) (0.259) (0.332) (0.494)
N 24 24 24 24 24 24
Pop. weights no yes no yes yes yes
Note: This table reproduces the speci¯cations from Table 6, Panel A, using data from the 1937 census,
where columns 3-6 correspond to columns 6-9 in Table 6. In Panel A, 1939 census data on the size of
the total Jewish population was replaced with 1937 census data whenever available. In Panel B, the
sample is restricted to observations for which 1937 data is available. This is the case for 7 out of the
11 oblasts classi¯ed as occupied and for 18 additional oblasts outside of the occupied area. Note that
the 1937 census does not contain information about the size of the Jewish middle class, such that we
cannot use 1937 information to replicate columns 3-5 of Table 6.
61Appendix Table 5
Growth of Occupied Ukrainian Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Log City Population 1989
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.020
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
N 105 105 105 105
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes
District F.E. yes yes no yes
Population Weights no no no yes
Panel B Log City Population
Year 1939 1959 1970 1989
Estimator OLS OLS OLS IV
Percent Jewish Pop. '39 x Occupation 0.016 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
N 105 105 105 105
Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes
District F.E. yes yes yes yes
Note: This table gives parallel speci¯cations to those from Tables 2 and 3
for a sample of Ukrainian cities, all of which were occupied during World
War II. Panel A reports ordinary least squares regressions. Speci¯cations
in all columns except column 1 contain geographical controls (degrees lon-
gitude and latitude). (We have not coded controls for the defense industry
for Ukrainian cities.) All speci¯cations except column 3 contain district ¯xed
e®ects. The regression reported in column 4 is weighted with population in
1939. All other columns report unweighted regressions. Dependent variable
in all columns is log city population 1989. All speci¯cations reported in Panel
B contain both geographic controls and district ¯xed e®ects. All columns in
Panel B except column 4 report ordinary least squares regressions. In column
4, log city population 1939 is instrumented with log city population 1926. De-
pendent variable is log city population in the indicated year. Percent Jewish
Pop. '39 x Occupation is the interaction between the percentage of the 1939
city population that was Jewish with a ¯xed e®ect for cities which were occu-
pied during World War II (German Occupation Dummy). All speci¯cations
in this table contain a constant term and control for log city population in
1939. See Data Appendix for details.
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Aginskii Buriatskii 0 0.24 0.00 0.93 -88.34
Amurskaia 0 0.54 . 1.79 0.00
Astrakhanskaia 0 0.51 0.55 2.45 423.25
Buriatiia 0 0.78 0.40 3.99 -1554.59
Cheliabinskaia 0 0.35 0.64 1.42 12873.44
Chitinskaia 0 0.55 0.23 1.78 -3921.44
Chukotskii 0 0.55 0.00 1.48 -117.55
Iaroslavskaia 0 0.31 0.26 1.40 -1343.39
Irkutskaia 0 0.96 0.56 4.08 -1027.88
Ivanovskaia 0 0.19 0.16 1.07 -619.10
Kaluzhskaia 0 0.74 0.30 5.70 -5755.96
Kamchatskaia 0 0.79 . 2.39 0.00
Kemerovskaia 0 0.49 0.20 2.32 -2570.67
Khabarovskii 0 1.86 0.87 4.69 -944.82
Komi-Permiatskii 0 0.12 0.00 0.37 -189.31
Koriakskii 0 0.39 . 1.15 0.00
Kurganskaia 0 0.13 . 0.58 0.00
Lipetskaia 0 0.49 . 4.30 0.00
Magadanskaia 0 2.10 . 5.39 .
Moskovskaia 0 1.14 1.08 5.92 13488.88
Murmanskaia 0 0.73 0.54 2.87 923.86
Novosibirskaia 0 0.33 0.54 1.83 6690.38
Orenburgkaia 0 0.24 0.48 1.29 4647.89
Penzenskaia 0 0.13 . 0.88 0.00
Permskaia 0 0.32 0.35 1.34 3584.38
Primorskii 0 0.80 0.33 2.22 -2739.28
Riazanskaia 0 0.12 . 1.25 0.00
Sakha 0 0.37 . 1.79 0.00
Sakhalinskaia 0 0.51 . 1.52 0.00
Samarskaia 0 0.51 0.89 2.93 11766.13
Sverdlovskaia 0 0.51 0.64 2.28 12629.77
Tambovskaia 0 0.13 . 0.76 0.00
Tatarstan 0 0.24 0.36 2.10 3368.87
Tomskaia 0 0.29 0.35 1.66 795.75
Tul'skaia 0 0.39 0.31 2.30 -596.85
Tverskaia 0 0.47 0.23 3.07 -7542.51
Udmurtskaia 0 0.13 . 0.68 0.00
Ul'ianovskaia 0 0.29 . 2.08 0.00
Ust'-Ordynskii Buriatskii 0 0.23 . 0.56 0.00
Vologodskaia 0 0.14 . 0.90 0.00
Belgorodskaia 1 0.25 . 2.79 -2959.12
Brianskaia 1 1.14 0.88 8.28 -6616.15
Kareliia 1 0.56 0.27 2.29 -822.20
Kurskaia 1 0.28 0.30 3.03 -581.29
Leningradskaia 1 0.59 0.49 3.44 -32.16
Novgorodskaia 1 0.59 . 3.44 -8017.32
Orlovskaia 1 0.60 . 6.10 -7751.15
Pskovskaia 1 0.41 0.32 2.94 -3134.25
Rostovskaia 1 1.31 0.63 6.21 -17101.44
Smolenskaia 1 1.12 0.57 8.72 -15867.69
Voronezhskaia 1 0.35 0.26 3.12 -3920.57
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